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Abstract
Can public interventions persistently reduce conflict? Adverse weather shocks,
through their impact on incomes, have been identified as robust drivers of conflict
in many contexts. An effective social insurance system moderates the impact of
adverse shocks on household incomes, and hence, could attenuate the link between
these shocks and conflict. This paper shows that a public employment program
in India, by providing an alternative source of income through a guarantee of 100
days of employment at minimum wages, effectively provides insurance. This has
an indirect pacifying effect. By weakening the link between productivity shocks
and incomes, the program uncouples productivity shocks from conflict, leading
persistently lower conflict levels.
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NREGA is the only way forward to take on the Maoists. This is nothing
about winning hearts and minds. Its only about giving people work before
the rebels come in and convince them that they are a better option than the
state. - NREGA officer, West Midnapore, West Bengal. (BBC 2010)
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1 Introduction
The World Bank estimates that 2 billion people currently live in countries where de-
velopment outcomes are affected by fragility, conflict, and violence. By 2030, the share
of global poor living in fragile and conflict-affected areas is projected to reach nearly
50% (Commission on Fragility and Development, 2018). Military and humanitarian
interventions costing billions of dollars are aimed at containing the spread of conflicts
or alleviating its consequences, but they too often fail to tackle the underlying roots of
conflict. Could these resources instead be effectively devoted to public interventions to
prevent conflicts from occurring in the first place? If so, how and where should public
resources be directed? This study shows that well-designed social insurance policies
can play a significant role in fostering stability and building resilience, and, through
these channels, help to reduce conflict and fragility.
In order to identify public interventions that can reduce conflict, an understanding
of the specific drivers of conflict is needed. Two interlinking empirical regularities
stand out in the literature across contexts. The first is the observation that low incomes
provide a breeding ground for civil conflict (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998, 2004; Hegre and
Sambanis, 2006); the second is the finding that adverse shocks to incomes cause new
conflicts to break out, and/or lead existing conflicts to intensify (Bazzi and Blattman,
2014; Dube and Vargas, 2013; Besley and Persson, 2008; Miguel et al., 2004; Fearon
and Laitin, 2003). The relationship between income shocks and conflict provides a
blueprint for policy. Any public intervention that helps households smooth incomes
has the potential to reduce conflict by breaking this key link. This paper provides
evidence that social insurance in the form of a public works program in India provided
effective insurance against adverse income shocks, thus leading to increased economic
resilience and markedly less conflict.
India is an ideal context to study for several reasons. On one side, India suffers
from several low-intensity intra-state conflicts in which armed groups fight the state.
Existing evidence from India suggests that weather shocks that lead to income losses
for people who are uninsured are an important driver of conflict (see Vanden Eynde,
2016; Gawande et al., 2017). On the other hand, India has sufficient state capacity to
administer social policies on the ground. In 2006, India introduced the National Ru-
ral Employment Guarantee Act (henceforth, NREGA), which established the world’s
largest public employment program. NREGA provides a safety net by creating a legal
entitlement to 100 days of public work per year. Participation is driven by the op-
portunity cost of employment: the provided work pays the official minimum wage.
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As a result, participation is only attractive for individuals with poor outside options,
specifically at times when economic conditions are bad. NREGA is the biggest pub-
lic employment program in history. In the financial year 2011-2012, it reached 3.8%
of the world’s population, providing employment for 49.8 million rural households,
generating 2.114 billion person-days of employment.1
The paper presents three main findings: first, I provide evidence that an income
channel drives conflict, a finding that confirms results from the existing literature on
conflict in India (see Vanden Eynde, 2016; Gawande et al., 2017). Using data on prox-
ies of agricultural income, specifically, agricultural output and agricultural wages, to-
gether with a two-period household level panel, I show that prior to the introduction of
NREGA, adverse monsoon rainfall realizations are linked to lower agricultural wages,
lower agricultural output, and lower household incomes among agricultural labor-
ers. The adverse monsoon rainfall-induced drops in agricultural incomes are, in turn,
linked to conflict.
With NREGA being rolled out, these relationships have changed markedly. Specif-
ically, I show that the relationship between monsoon rainfall and agricultural wages
has become substantially weaker. Similarly, household incomes among unskilled agri-
cultural laborers effectively cease to be a function of monsoon rainfall. As a result of
NREGA, local monsoon variation ceases to affect low skilled agricultural wages, and
poorer households are insulated from monsoon-induced income volatility. At the same
time, however, monsoon rainfall continues to be an important driver of overall agri-
cultural output (and wages of higher-skilled workers). This is not surprising: while
NREGA may provide a stable wage floor, it is not expected to have dramatic effects on
the role that monsoon rainfall plays in driving agricultural production processes; simi-
larly, NREGA will not directly affect the wages of higher-skilled laborers, for whom the
wage floor established by the program was not binding to begin with. Lastly, I study
how the link between monsoon rainfall and conflict changes. The main finding is that
the relationship between monsoon rainfall and conflict effectively disappeared. The
results are robust to a wide range of checks. Moreover, I am able to provide evidence
in support of the underlying common trends assumption: the elasticity linking mon-
soon rainfall to conflict only becomes distinctly weaker with the roll out of NREGA in
a district. I further rule out alternative potential explanations and show that the effect
of NREGA is most pronounced in the least-developed districts.
The remaining analysis provides further evidence in support of the reduced-form
1See http://nrega.nic.in/netnrega/mpr_ht/nregampr.aspx, accessed on 14.06.2014.
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findings, which highlight that the observed changes in conflict stem from the pro-
gram providing what effectively serves as insurance against adverse monsoon rainfall-
induced income shocks. First, using official NREGA data, I show that participation
in the program responds to adverse monsoon rainfall realizations, both along the in-
tensive and extensive margin. A quantification exercise suggests that NREGA expen-
ditures flowing into a district compensate for at least 20% of the overall district-level
income losses attributable to adverse monsoon rainfall. This estimate is likely a lower
bound of the actual insurance value of the program to households because the stabiliza-
tion of agricultural wages offers a further indirect insurance benefit also to individuals
not participating in NREGA.2 Second, I construct a measure capturing whether (or
the extent to which) participation in NREGA is responsive to monsoon variation at
the district level. I show that districts in which NREGA participation is responsive to
monsoon variation experience up to 50% lower levels of conflict. As before, I provide
evidence to support for the underlying common trends assumption.
My findings contribute to several literatures. Whether public, non-military inter-
ventions affect conflict is an ongoing academic debate. Typically, this literature ex-
plores the effect of various shocks to aid. Berman et al. (2011) show that, in particular,
small-scale, local development projects can reduce conflict. Nunn and Qian (2014)
show that U.S. food aid prolonged low-intensity internal conflict. Their work relates
to that of Crost and Johnston (2014) who find a positive relationship between World
Bank-funded aid and conflict in the Philippines. Hence, there is mixed evidence on
the relationship between aid and conflict. Berman et al. (2013) suggest that key factors
are the context in which aid is provided and how it is delivered. NREGA provides a
distinctly different delivery vehicle for aid because it is demand-led with self-selection
of households ensuring that transfers are targeted. Furthermore, the mechanics of par-
ticipation makes organized aid-capture of NREGA spoils (as e.g. highlighted in Nunn
and Qian, 2014) more difficult; lastly, the decentralized administration ensures that
local preferences are reflected in the choice of the public works projects.
This paper also relates to the broader literature on the economics of conflict and
labor markets. A core theoretical foundation in this literature is the opportunity cost
channel (see Becker, 1968): by reducing the returns to labor, negative productivity
shocks may render joining or supporting an insurgency movement incentive compat-
ible. This eventually translates into increased conflict (see Chassang, 2009; Dal Bo´
2Muralidharan et al. (2017) highlight the general equilibrium effects of NREGA on rural labor markets,
suggesting these are likely significantly larger compared to the direct program benefits.
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and Dal Bo´, 2011). Empirically, evidence in support of this channel is mixed. Bazzi
and Blattman (2014) find that positive (commodity price-induced) income shocks may
shorten existing conflicts, while Crost and Felter (2019) find that (export) commodity
price shocks in the Philippines cause an increase in violence which is concentrated in
parts of the country where export crop production is due to large firms. Fetzer and
Kyburz (2018) highlight the role of institutions: cohesive democratic institutions in
Nigeria weaken the pass-through of commodity price shocks on conflict. Dube and
Vargas (2013), while finding evidence consistent with a rapacity-effect also find evi-
dence consistent with an opportunity cost channel as negative shocks to the returns of
labor are associated with an intensification of conflict. Shapiro et al. (2011) study how
unemployment affects insurgency violence in Afghanistan, Iraq and the Philippines.
They find limited support for an opportunity-cost channel. This contrasts with the
work of Guardado and Pennings (2017), who find significant evidence in support of
its relevance in seasonal labor markets. Iyengar et al. (2011) find that increased pub-
lic construction spending reduces certain types of labor-intensive insurgent activities.
Using a randomized controlled trial, Annan and Blattman (2016) show that providing
training and capital to young men, can greatly increase the opportunity cost of becom-
ing a mercenary, and, thus, may contribute to a weakening in the relationship between
shocks and conflict.3 The results presented here suggest that an opportunity cost chan-
nel may be driving conflict in India, which becomes weaker once NREGA reduces the
pass-through of productivity shocks on to household incomes, particularly among the
population most vulnerable to insurgent recruitment and mobilization.
Lastly, the paper relates to a growing literature studying conflict and crime in In-
dia. Iyer and Topalova (2014) and Sekhri and Storeygard (2014) study the impact of
weather shocks on crimes in general and crimes against minorities specifically, while
Vanden Eynde (2016) and Gawande et al. (2017) find evidence in support of an op-
portunity cost channel driving Maoist conflict. Dasgupta et al. (2017), which is closely
related to this paper, use a difference-in-differences approach to compare districts that
received NREGA early with those that received it later; they find that the introduc-
tion is correlated with a reduction in conflict. This approach is not without problems
because the sequence of NREGA’s roll-out was far from random. Khanna and Zimmer-
mann (2017) tackle this using a regression discontinuity design which, while subject
to power concerns, finds that NREGA lead to an increase in conflict in the short term.
3This contrasts with Blattman et al. (2014), who find that a Ugandan employment program, despite
generating large income gains, is not correlated with lower levels of aggression or protests.
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They argue that this is driven by increased insurgent repression of civilians, who share
more information with security forces in anticipation of the NREGA-led development.
This paper steers clear of these concerns by exploiting variation solely within - not
across - the NREGA implementation phases, and by focusing on the role of NREGA in
providing insurance.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the background and data
used in this study. Section 3 presents the main empirical approach and the main
findings. Sections 4 and 5 present evidence that NREGA provides insurance and that
the insurance reduces conflict levels. Section 6 concludes.
2 Background and Data
2.1 Conflict in India
India faces challenges from several insurgency movements. The Maoist insurgency,
which is active across many parts of India, is among the most prolific, and it has
been a particular focus of the academic literature. The insurgency started as a peasant
revolt against landlords and extortive labor practices in the village of Naxalbari in
West Bengal in 1967. From there, the “Naxalite” movement (as it is also commonly
referred to) spread across India and evolved into an armed insurgency with the stated
goals of overthrowing the Indian state and establishing a communist political and
social order. In 2004, the two predominant Maoist groups, the Maoist Communist
Center (MCC) and the People’s War Group (PWG), merged forming the Communist
Party of India-Maoist (CPI-M). Estimates of the size of the CPI-M’s vary widely, with
estimates of anywhere from 5,000 to 40,000 armed cadres, and up to 100,000 village
militia members.4
The Maoist insurgency is a regional phenomenon, which is clearly visible in the left
panel of Figure 1. The map plots districts that form the “red corridor” using a classifi-
cation from the Indian Ministry of Home Affairs. This coding will be used throughout
in the remainder of the paper. Districts in the red corridor are less developed: they
have lower rates of urbanization, higher degrees of illiteracy, and limited access to
infrastructure (such as paved roads, electricity, primary education and health care fa-
cilities, see Table 1). Economic livelihoods in red corridor districts are dominated by
subsistence farming, sharecropping, and wage employment in the agricultural sector.
As this paper underscores, the income-generating process of the agriculture sector
4See e.g. http://goo.gl/xfVewL, accessed 20.01.2013.
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strongly depends on rainfall during the monsoon season.5
The Maoists are entrenched in rural communities, with a network of village militias
through which, for example, Jan-Adalats (people’s courts) settle disputes at a local
level (Chakrabarty and Kujur, 2009). The Maoists organize riots and protests and,
during times of economic duress, launch “famine raids” on grain storage facilities
(Dash, 2006). Through the organization of bandhs (strikes), the Maoists push for higher
wages in rural areas (Ranjan and Prasad, 2012) and coerce money lenders into relaxing
their credit terms during times of distress (Srivastava, 2006). The organization of these
types of violent and non-violent activities is often directly related to poor economic
conditions, and is used to foster popular support for the armed struggle against the
state.
Recruiting of fighters is central to the Maoist efforts to maintain the armed struggle.
The Maoists are said to pay their fighters monthly stipends, and to actively recruit
teenagers into service. Verma (2011) argues that environments of deprivation following
a bad harvest allow the “Maoists to step in, by paying a handsome amount of around
3,000 rupees to the young and promising parents that their kids will have food and
money.” Accounts suggest that the Maoists pay their fighters monthly stipends of
around 1,500 rupees (Ramana, 2007). This figure is significant when compared to
average wages for agricultural day laborers, who receive between 50 and 70 rupees per
day (in India’s poorest districts (see Table 1). This highlights the role that economic
shocks to incomes can play both in fostering insurgency activities and recruitment, a
crucial link that an effective social insurance can break. The next section discusses how
this paper leverages a new conflict event data set built from a large raw text corpus.
2.2 Measurement of Conflict
This paper leverages computational linguistic methods to retrieve conflict event in-
formation from a large corpus of 41,347 newspaper clippings gathered by the South
Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) from 2000 to 2014 (see Manning et al., 2008 for an in-
troduction to information retrieval). As the SATP corpus is the most extensive and
systematic collection of news coverage of conflict in India, the resulting conflict dataset
significantly expands both the temporal and spatial coverage of other currently existing
data sets available. Specifically, by covering more than 61 distinct, English-language
sources, the corpus vastly expands on the small sets of press agency sources typically
5Data from the National Sample Survey 2001 suggest that 64.9% of Indian households rely on agri-
culture as a main income source. In Chhattisgarh, one of the main Maoist states, up to 90% of the
population is employed in agriculture, with generally poor development indicators and higher levels of
food insecurity very common in agriculture-intensive areas (Radhakrishna and Ray, 2006).
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used in traditional conflict event data bases, such as the Global Terrorism Database
(GTD).6 As a result, the data include nearly 10 times as many conflict events.
To illustrate how conflict event information is extracted from raw texts, consider
the example of a sentence below from a typical newspaper clipping. I leverage the
SENNA Natural Language Processing package developed by Collobert et al. (2011).
Upon parsing, the package provides a part of speech and a parse tree for each sentence,
labeling the syntactic role of each word within a sentence. As a result, for every verb,
the process identifies its underlying subject, object, and surrounding meta-information
(such as time and location). These are indicated by prepositions or their syntactic
positions in a sentence. From this starting point, the data undergo further refinement
in a sequence of steps. The first step focuses on sentences that include verbs that are
Two unidentified terrorists︸ ︷︷ ︸
subject
verb︷ ︸︸ ︷
massacred
object︷ ︸︸ ︷
six members of a family
and
verb︷︸︸︷
left
object︷ ︸︸ ︷
a seventh
verb︷ ︸︸ ︷
injured
time & location︷ ︸︸ ︷
at Mangnar Top, Poonch district, on December 31, 2001.
indicative the occurrence of a violent event. The set of verbs considered in this way
is broader than would be generated through common manual coding approaches that
would only look at subsets of of texts containing certain keywords (such as “to kill”).7
The second refinement standardizes the extracted locational information; this defines
a common spatial resolution, which, in the case of the SATP corpus, is the district
level.8 The last step labels actors, and counts conflict casualties. This process involves
collecting human judgements from a crowd-sourcing platform, and squaring these
human judgements with a trained support-vector machine. The focus is particularly
on the object of a verb. In the above example, the object of the verb “massacred” is
“six members of a family,” which is coded as civilian casualties. The data construction
and coding are described in more detail in Appendix B.1, which also benchmarks
the dataset against other conflict event data, highlighting that the coverage is much
broader.
For the empirical exercises, I focus on two measures of conflict: conflict intensity,
6The results are robust to using the Gawande et al. (2017) local language source-based conflict data.
Appendix Table B1 lists the most frequently sources, while Appendix Table B2 provides an overview of
other papers that have hand-coded smaller subsets of the SATP corpus.
7The set of verbs considered is presented in appendix B.1. The approach is similar to what is used in
global event data bases such as IECWS (Boschee et al., 2018) or GDELT (Leetaru and Schrodt, 2014).
8The populations of all unique locations are matched against a gazetteer of district and location names
to achieve a geographic resolution at the 2001 census district level.
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captured as the total number of conflict events in a district and year, and a measure of
the total number of persons either killed or injured. I focus on the set of 239 districts
which have variation over time in both these measures from 2000-2014. Figure 2 plots
the total number of conflict events per year captured in my data. Overall, conflict
intensity is relatively low, with an average of 1,169 conflict events per year. Conflict has
increased over time, most markedly for the poorest districts, which received NREGA
early on in Phase 1.
2.3 Productivity shocks and agricultural output measures
Rainfall, especially during the monsoon season, is a central input to the agricul-
tural production process in India. To empirically confirm the relevance of rainfall for
incomes, and to study whether NREGA has changed these relationships, I draw on
three different data sources. First, I construct a measure of agricultural output using
state-level farm harvest prices and annual crop production statistics by district, crop
and fiscal year (mapped to the nearest calendar year) from the the Directorate of Eco-
nomics and Statistics. This yields an unbalanced panel covering the period from 1999
to 2011.9 Second, I use average annual wages at the district level to construct a mea-
sure of labor productivity; I leverage data from the Agricultural Wages in India (AWI)
series. This also yields an unbalanced district level panel from 1998 to 2010 10 Lastly,
I draw on data from the Indian Human Development Household Survey (IDHS), for
which a first wave was conducted in 2004/2005. A second wave was conducted in
2011/2012, after NREGA had been introduced (Desai and Vanneman, 2018). The sur-
vey provides detailed information on the income sources of households over the past
year and, for the second wave, asks about NREGA participation.
A central focus of this paper is to study how incomes in rural areas are affected
by monsoon season rainfall and explore how these relationships have changed due to
NREGA. To measure monsoon season rainfall, I draw in data from the Tropical Rain-
fall Measuring Mission (TRMM) satellite, which is the highest-quality, remote-sensed
rainfall dataset, with global coverage currently available.11 The monsoon accounts for
around 70% of India’s annual rainfall and is crucial for agricultural production. Yet,
rainfall from the monsoon is not uniform across India. Figure 3 illustrates the typical
growing season cycle, the distribution of rainfall and employment under NREGA for
9The fiscal year begins in April and ends in March of the subsequent calendar year. The full list of 22
crops and more information about the construction of output value are provided in Appendix B.6.
10Berg et al. (2018) is a recent paper using this data. Appendix B.7 presents the data in more detail in
discusses some known data issues.
11Appendix B.8 provides more details on the data.
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the state of Andhra Pradesh across a year. Using state-level crop calendars, I construct
a state-specific monsoon period.
This is used to construct district-level monsoon season rainfall by calendar year. I
convert the monsoon season rainfall data at the 0.25 x 0.25 grid level to an unweighted
district-level average across the grid cells. The resulting measure provides the average
amount of rainfall (in millimeters) that a district receives. I also use as a placebo the
rainfall outside the monsoon season, which has a much weaker link with incomes. The
next section provides background and introduces the data I use to measure NREGA
participation.
2.4 NREGA Workfare Program
NREGA, established in 2005, is a legal entitlement to 100 days of (minimum) wage
paid public employment per household, per fiscal year, in rural areas. It was rolled
out in three phases. A first set of 200 districts received it in 2006; another 130 districts
added in 2007; and from 2008 the program was available in all Indian districts (except
a few urban centers). The rollout was far from random. Table 1 highlights that districts
receiving NREGA early had significantly lower agricultural output per capita, lower
wages, and worse access to public goods. They were also more likely to be part of the
red corridor and to have experienced higher levels of conflict. This suggests that dis-
tricts across different NREGA implementation phases are likely poor control groups.
As a result, I make sure not to exploit this variation in the empirical design.
NREGA is administered at the village level, and is designed to be demand led.
Employment on public works projects is provided once households express their will-
ingness to work, with the village governing body (Gram Panchayat) required to pro-
vide the specified number of days of work within a two-week period. The wage rate
is fixed at the state-level minimum wage. Villages are empowered through the act,
which gives them a say in what local public goods are needed. NREGA public works
broadly fall into categories of drought-proofing, micro-irrigation, sanitation, and road
construction. While infrastructure developed through NREGA could have an inde-
pendent effect on the relationship between monsoon rainfall and incomes, no strong
evidence of this channel is detectable in the data I study.
In order to study whether NREGA provides insurance, I obtain official participation
data for the period between 2006 and 2013. I focus on expenditure per capita, the share
of households participating under NREGA in a given fiscal year, and the total number
of days worked per capita. I study how these figures respond to variation in local
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monsoon season rainfall. To be consistent throughout, I match the fiscal year that
ranges from April to March to the nearest calendar year.12
NREGA participation is most widespread in districts that received NREGA early
on (in phases 1 and 2) of the rollout, as highlighted in Panel F of Table 1. The par-
ticipation rate in these districts is significantly higher compared to the 31% rate of
participation in districts that entered the program in the third phase. Similarly, ex-
penditure per capita in these districts is around one-third higher, reflecting a higher
baseline demand for NREGA employment. NREGA is available and widely used in
areas affected by conflict. The 239 districts that experience some conflict events in my
data account for more than 52% of the overall NREGA expenditures across India. As
I show, these are also the areas where demand for NREGA is most sensitive to local
monsoon variation. Rather than being opposed to the program, the Maoists have in
some cases demonstrated outright support for it; for example, they have put up posters
urging villagers to claim their rights under the act.13
In order to shed light on the extent to which NREGA provides insurance, I study
how monsoon season rainfall in the previous growing season increases demand for
NREGA employment prior to the next agricultural cycle. Figure 3 illustrates the timing
of NREGA employment relative to the monsoon cycle by using the case of the state of
Andhra Pradesh in the 2011-2012 period. Take-up is concentrated in the lean season
before the start of the new agricultural cycle. The number of households participating
peaks in May at around 4.5 million households, and declines to just around 200,000
during the harvest months when agricultural labor demand reaches its peak.
The design of NREGA has several appealing features. NREGA requires that house-
holds actually work at minimum wages; thus, it induces self-selection of individuals
with poor outside options, and ensures that NREGA assistance is better targeted (see
Besley and Coate, 1992; Nichols and Zeckhauser, 1982). Further, infrastructure con-
struction through public employment simplifies monitoring of the program as output
is easily verifiable. This can reduce moral hazard problems that could arise due to the
decentralized nature of the program. As a result, it has been suggested that NREGA is
much better targeted than other welfare programs (see Desai et al., 2015). Yet, NREGA
also faces implementation challenges. Early on, leakage of NREGA funds and with-
holding of wages were documented (Niehaus and Sukhtankar, 2013a,b). Over time,
implementation quality has improved, aided by the introduction of a national biomet-
12Refer to Appendix B.9 for further discussion of the available NREGA data.
13See Hindustan Times, http://goo.gl/r4g8mm, accessed 22.04.2013.
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ric identification card (Muralidharan et al., 2016), direct transfers of wage payments to
recipients’ bank accounts, and ICT-fostered improvements in administrative processes
(Banerjee et al., 2017). The most-cited barrier that may undermine NREGA’s role in
providing insurance is the failure of panchayats to provide work (Dutta et al., 2014).
For the purposes of this paper, the main threat is that rationing itself is more preva-
lent during periods of economic distress induced by poor monsoon season rainfall.
Complementing the analysis of official NREGA data, I draw on self-reported NREGA
participation data from the second wave of the IDHS. This allows me to study whether
rationing is correlated with monsoon season rainfall, and will reveal that rationing is
most prevalent when overall demand for NREGA work is low. This is consistent with
the idea that panchayats may be reluctant to incur the fixed cost of drawing up public
works projects when overall demand for work is low.
The size and, more importantly, the direct delivery of NREGA resources to rural
households could have an impact on the relationship between local monsoon shocks
and income in the agricultural sector; through this channel the NREGA could have an
affect on conflict. I next discuss the empirical strategy and presents the main results.
3 Empirical Strategy and Main Results
3.1 Empirical Strategy
I present results from two sets of main specifications. Specification 1, estimated
through OLS, examines how NREGA changes the way that contemporaneous monsoon
rainfall in district d and calendar year t, Rd,t, affects agricultural output or wages, yd,t.
log(ydt) = η × log(Rd,t) + θ × Tdt × log(Rd,t) + ad + bp(d),r(d),t + edprt (1)
E(Adt) = ad exp [ β× log(Rd,t−1) + γ× Tdt × log(Rd,t−1) + bp(d),r(d),t + νdprt] (2)
Specification 2 examines how NREGA changes the relationship between lagged mon-
soon season rainfall Rd,t−1 and conflict, Adt, measured either as the total number of
conflict events or the total number of casualties. Given the count data nature, this
specification is estimated using a Poisson model. The indicator Tdt is a dummy vari-
able, indicating whether NREGA is available in a district d at a point in time t.
All specifications include district fixed effects, ad, which absorb any time-invariant
characteristics that explain different levels of agricultural output, wages or conflict.
Further, the specifications control for non-linear time trends, indicated by bp(d),r(d),t.
These time effects are specified at the level of the geographic region r by NREGA im-
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plementation phase p pair. Hence, the time effects control for shocks that are common
to the groups of districts that start to receive NREGA from the same point in time and
are located within the same geographic region.14 As a result, the treatment indicator,
Tdt, is perfectly collinear with these time effects. This ensures that I do not exploit
variation across NREGA implementation phases, which is prudent as the assignment
of districts to the three NREGA roll out phases p was not random (see Table 1).
The only difference between specifications 1 and 2 is the timing of the monsoon
rainfall measure. The contemporaneous monsoon rainfall measure log(Rd,t) affects
contemporaneous wages and agricultural output ydt, while it is the lagged monsoon
shock log(Rd,t−1) that translates into conflict. The choice of empirical design closely
follows the income-generating process: the main harvest happens towards the end
of the calendar year, which coincides with peak labor demand, see Figure 3. This
empirical model also maps well onto the existing literature that documents a lagged
effect of (proxies of) income on the intensity of conflict in India (see Gawande et al.,
2017; Vanden Eynde, 2016).
The focus of the empirical analysis rests on the interplay between the estimated
coefficients η and θ in specification 1, and β and γ in specification 2 respectively. The
coefficient η captures the relationship between monsoon rainfall and agricultural out-
put and wages. We would expect these coefficients to be positive, η > 0, indicating that
negative monsoon shocks translate into lower output and wages, respectively. On the
other hand, we expect the estimate on the reduced form relationship linking monsoon
rainfall and conflict to be negative, β < 0. The causal chain is simple: less monsoon
rainfall translate into lower incomes due to reduced productivity, which increases con-
flict. The estimates of the coefficients θ and γ capture how these relationships have
changed, on average, for the years following the introduction of NREGA. With regard
to agricultural wages, we would expect that the estimated coefficient on the NREGA
interaction would be negative, θ < 0. NREGA establishes a binding wage floor, which
should weaken the pass through of negative shocks, in particular. With regards to agri-
cultural output, the impact of NREGA is ambiguous. The infrastructure constructed
through NREGA, such as micro-irrigation, could directly alter the functional relation-
ship between rainfall and output; thus, NREGA could induce farmers to plant crops
that are more susceptible to weather shocks, but yield higher expected return (see
14Districts d are mapped to three geographic regions r(d). The regions are the North-East, includ-
ing Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Tripura, Sikkim; the states
making up the red corridor in the east, (Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Karnataka,
Maharashtra, Orissa, West Bengal); a third region contains the remaining states in the west. Given that
there are three NREGA implementation tranches, there are nine region by implementation phase pairs.
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Gehrke, 2017 for a paper presenting evidence in support of this channel).
Lastly, regarding the reduced form specification to study conflict, we expect the
estimated coefficient on the interaction to be positive, γ > 0, relative to the negative
coefficient, β < 0. Of interest are the sign and the joint significance of the estimated co-
efficients β+ γ. If the sum of these two coefficients turns out to be small in magnitude,
this suggests that the relationship between monsoon rainfall and conflict has become
weaker in the wake of the introduction of NREGA. This is the central hypothesis of
this paper.
3.2 Results
I present the main results in Table 2. Column (1) shows how agricultural output
per capita is a function of monsoon season rainfall, focusing on the interplay between
the coefficient before and after NREGA was introduced. The point estimate suggests
that, on average, a 1% reduction in monsoon rainfall decreases output value by around
0.32%. This relationship is broadly unchanged after NREGA has been introduced. This
is not surprising: NREGA aims to produce sustainable local infrastructure, which in
the longer run could make the agricultural production function less dependent on rain.
On the other hand, changes in crop choice could increase the sensitivity as suggested
by Gehrke (2017). Thus, the absence of such an effect is unsurprising.
Column (2) presents results for agricultural wages. Before the introduction of
NREGA, the association between monsoon rainfall and wages is significant and pos-
itive, suggesting that negative rainfall conditions translate into lower wages. Study-
ing the NREGA interaction effect with the monsoon rainfall measure suggests that
the relationship between monsoon rainfall and wages has disappeared in the wake
of NREGA’s introduction. NREGA provides a safe outside option, implying that the
program stabilizes incomes for participating households, and has a general equilib-
rium effect on agricultural labor markets (Muralidharan et al., 2016). This finding
extends the existing research on NREGA’s impact on agricultural labor markets (Berg
et al., 2018; Imbert and Papp, 2015).15 Turning to conflict outcomes, these results are
presented in columns (3) and (4). Before the introduction of NREGA, the elasticity
between monsoon rainfall and conflict intensity – as measured by the number of con-
flict events in column (3) – suggests that a 1% reduction in monsoon rainfall increases
15Given that Berg et al. (2018) have pointed out some issues with the AWI data it is reassuring that
Appendix Table A1 highlights that similar effects on wages can be found when studying alternative
wage data from the village-level component of the two rounds of the IDHS survey. In the table, I show
the contrast between the wages of agricultural day laborers and those of skilled workers; the effect on
stabilizing wages is driven by agricultural day laborers for whom the NREGA wage floor is likely binding.
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conflict intensity by 1.4%. A 25% shock to monsoon rainfall would increase conflict
intensity by around 33%. Given that the average district in the estimating sample ex-
periences 4.5 conflict events per year, this would translate into 1.5 additional events
per district or about 1006 conflict events. The result for the number of casualties (fa-
talities and injuries) in column (4) is very similar. This suggests that the relationship
between monsoon rainfall and conflict has changed markedly since the introduction
of NREGA. The test of the joint significance of the two coefficients fails to reject the
null hypothesis of no association between monsoon rainfall and conflict in the wake of
NREGA’s introduction.
Common Trends A main concern of the analysis is whether the relationship be-
tween monsoon rainfall and conflict had already changed prior to the introduction
of NREGA (i.e., whether trends in the relationship between monsoon rainfall and con-
flict are wrongly attributed to NREGA). One such confounder could be India’s steady
economic growth, which could have lead to a gradual weakening of the relationship
between income shocks and conflict. To test for this, I use a more flexible version
of specification 2, where I estimate a separate coefficient for how monsoon rainfall is
related to conflict for each point in time βt relative to the NREGA introduction. The
estimated specification is:
E(Adt) = ad exp [
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∑
w=1
βt × Timep,t × log(Rd,t−1) + bp(d),r(d),t + νdprt] (3)
The results plotting out the estimated coefficients, β̂t are presented in Figure 4. The
vertical line around zero refers to the period when NREGA was introduced. The
solid blue lines indicate the regression coefficients obtained from the baseline pooled
specification. The estimated coefficients suggest a consistently negative relationship
between monsoon rainfall and conflict before the introduction of NREGA, with the
relationship only getting markedly weaker after NREGA was introduced.
Non-parametric analysis In addition to the parametric approach, I also present re-
sults from a non-parametric analysis that highlights non-linearities, which may help
shed light on the mechanisms that explain the NREGA effect. I follow Hsiang et al.
(2013), capturing non-linearities by estimating local linear regressions. The approach
incorporates uncertainty in the shape of functional form by estimating these local lin-
ear regressions on 1,000 bootstrapped samples. The uncertainty is then visually repre-
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sented by decreasing the color saturation of the non-parametric regression lines when
the variance of estimates increases. I also present results from a more conventional
approach to estimate non-linearities using different deciles of the monsoon rainfall
variable.
The result from this analysis is presented in Figure 5. The figure plots out boot-
strapped lowess estimates of the relationship between monsoon rainfall and the de-
pendent variables for the periods before (Panel A top row) and after NREGA was in-
troduced (Panel B bottom row).16 The relationship between monsoon rainfall and agri-
cultural output per capita indicates a strong positive relationship: increasing monsoon
rainfall increases output, but at a decreasing rate for higher levels of monsoon rain-
fall. Importantly, however, this relationship looks fairly similar before (top) and after
the introduction of NREGA (bottom). Moving to column (2), the relationship between
agricultural wages and monsoon rainfall looks quite different in panel A compared to
panel B. Before the introduction of NREGA, there is significant pass-through of low
monsoon rainfall realizations resulting in lower wages (mapping well onto the findings
of Sarsons, 2015; Burgess et al., 2014; Jayachandran, 2006). The non-parametric results
suggest that low monsoon rainfall has ceased to depress wages since the introduction
of NREGA.17
The last column explores the relationship between monsoon rainfall and conflict.
Before the introduction of NREGA, there is a weak U-shaped relationship. Places, that
experience low monsoon season rainfall see an increase in conflict, while places that
see a relatively positive realization above the district-specific mean seeing reductions in
conflict, though again, at a decreasing rate as for excessive monsoon rainfall effect, the
monsoon rainfall and conflict relationship starts bending back up. This implies that a
linear regression, for the period before NREGA, is likely to underestimate the effect of
monsoon rainfall on conflict, as the positive tail pushes up the estimate of the slope of
the linear regression. Following the introduction of NREGA, the relationship changes
fundamentally. Throughout, there is no statistically significant association between
monsoon rainfall and conflict. This, together with the linear regression results, sug-
gests that any statistically and economically significant association between monsoon
and conflict has disappeared.
16Appendix Figure A1 presents very similar results using an alternative approach using rainfall deciles.
17In Appendix Figure A2, I show that very similar results can be found using data on unskilled agri-
cultural laborer wages from the the village-level component of the IDHS survey. The results are not
inconsistent with Kaur (2018), who finds that real wages do respond to shocks, while nominal wages are
downwardly rigid. The region-phase-specific non-linear time trends capture price changes, and hence,
the nominal wages are indirectly deflated in my setup.
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Robustness checks Appendix Table A2 highlights that the results presented here are
not an artefact of the conflict dataset that was leveraged. Using the local-language
newspaper based Maoist conflict dataset developed by Gawande et al. (2017) covering
the period 2001-2009, across four state and 67 districts as of the 1991 district bound-
aries, I find very similar results. Appendix Table A3 highlights that results are robust
to alternative transformations of the rainfall variable and to using alternative sources
of the rainfall data. Appendix Figure A3 shows that results are further robust to drop-
ping each state in turn, alleviating concerns that the results may be driven by any one
specific state.18 I next turn to ruling out alternative explanations.
3.3 Alternative explanations
A main concern is that the observed changes in the relationship between monsoon
rainfall and conflict could be driven by other policy changes or, potentially, by changes
in police strategy.
Are results due to changes in police strategy? I perform four additional exercises
that support the interpretation that the effects documented here are not spuriously
driven by changes in police strategy. First, in Table 3, I decompose the conflict-event
data across different types of events. Columns (1) and (2) of the table replicate the
main results. In columns (3)-(5) I use casualty figures for three different casualty
types: civilian, security force and militants. The results suggest that the weakening of
the monsoon-conflict relationship is quite uniform, suggesting that the responsiveness
of either type of casualties to monsoon season rainfall has not changed in a particularly
distinguishable fashion that could indicate a changed police strategy. Column (6) looks
at events that report the arrests of militants, while column (7) studies events that do
not produce casualties (such as bombings on physical infrastructure). The results are
similar to previous results; there is no indication that arrests have become much more
prevalent after a bad monsoon shock beyond the wider observation that overall conflict
has become less responsive to monsoon variation. This is particularly relevant if there
are concerns that the introduction of NREGA may have led to an increased police
presence.
Second, in Table 4 I add different sets of additional controls with the baseline
results presented in column (1). Indian states are responsible for maintaining law
18Results are also robust to alternative functional forms (OLS on the counts, negative binomial or linear
probability models). Further results highlight that agricultural output and wages are predominantly
driven by monsoon season rainfall (and not by rainfall in the rest of the year or by temperature measures).
These are available upon request.
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and order; thus, it is reassuring that results are robust to controlling for state by time
fixed effects (see column 2). In column (3), I allow for a different set of district fixed
effects for the period before and after NREGA was introduced. This absorbs a district-
specific NREGA treatment effect on conflict levels. Such an effect on conflict-levels
may, for example, account for differential district-level police deployment, which may
have a distinct district-specific effect on conflict. Reassuringly, the observed effects on
the changing rainfall-conflict elasticity before and after NREGA remain intact. Lastly,
column (4) adds a district-specific linear trend, while column (5) uses a less demanding
set of time effects. Throughout, the main results remain intact.
Third, I leverage state-level data from the Bureau of Police Research and Develop-
ment (BPRD). These data, available for the 2004-2014 period, provide information on
the size of the state-armed police force, the size of the civil police, and the number
of police stations, police outposts (which can be semi-permanent tactical bases), and
armed battalions. I add these regressors, varying at the state-by-year level, as con-
trols interacted with the NREGA treatment indicator. This may account for changes
in the monsoon rainfall and conflict elasticity, which may be confounded by states ex-
panding their police force or their physical presence across tactical bases in a fashion
that may be correlated with the timing of the NREGA rollout. Table 5 highlights that
the weakening of the monsoon-rainfall link after NREGA’s introduction remains intact
even when allowing the time-varying measures of police force strength and the (albeit
crude) proxies of their presence to have a heterogenous effect across districts that re-
ceived NREGA earlier rather than later. Lastly, despite the fact that security and the
maintenance of law and order are a state-level responsibility, the central government
may assist state security forces through the dispatch of the Central Reserve Police Force
(CRPF) for counter-insurgency operations. From early 2010, the CRPF was dispatched
due to the launch of the Operation Green Hunt that specifically targeted left-wing
extremist-affected districts. The dispatch was coupled with the rollout of the the Inte-
grated Action Plan (IAP), which provided targeted aid spending in areas judged to be
affected by the left-wing extremism. Hence, it is not inconceivable that districts receiv-
ing IAP funds were also likely to see CRPF deployment. Column (1) of Table 6 shows
that allocation of IAP funds was not targeted to areas with a poor monsoon season
rainfall. In columns (2) and (5) the sample is restricted to remove the 33 districts that
received IAP support. Columns (3) and (6) restrict the analysis to cover the time up
to 2010, before much of the IAP activity and Operation Green Hunt started. Lastly,
columns (4) and (8) control for IAP spending. Throughout, the observed patterns re-
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main intact, suggesting that the rainfall-conflict elasticity has become markedly weaker
since the introduction of NREGA; this allays concerns that results may be confounded
by changes in security-force presence or strategy.
Other mechanisms There could yet be a set of alternative plausible mechanisms
through which the rainfall and conflict elasticity may have changed since the intro-
duction of NREGA. A first placebo check, which is indicative of the underlying in-
come mechanism, is presented in column (1) of Table 7. Rainfall falling outside the
monsoon season (which is a much weaker correlate of agricultural productivity and
wages) does not meaningfully correlate with conflict, and NREGA does not change
that pattern. This is suggestive evidence that the income-relevance of monsoon season
rainfall is driving the association with conflict.
There are several alternative policy shocks that could be plausibly affecting the
relationship between income shocks and conflict in a distinct way. In columns (2)
and (3) of Table 7, I control for the rollout of the Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana
Rural Road Construction Scheme (henceforth, PMGSY). The scheme expands rural
connectivity and may have a distinct effect on the relationship between income and
conflict (see e.g. Burgess and Donaldson, 2010; Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Column (2)
indicates that road construction is correlated with a weaker monsoon rainfall-conflict
relationship. Once controlling for the NREGA main interaction in column (3) this effect
disappears, suggesting that the NREGA interaction better captures the distinct change
in the monsoon rainfall and conflict relationship.19 Another concern is that the timing
of the introduction of NREGA coincides with a commodity price boom. Vanden Eynde
(2016) finds a weaker effect of monsoon shocks on conflict in places where mining is an
important source of income and, thus, household incomes are less affected by weather
shocks. In columns (4) and (5), I study the role of the mining sector, as measured
by the share of the mining sector in the district domestic product as a cross-sectional
characteristic, which is available for 221 out of 239 districts that experience conflict.
Out of this sample, 20 report that the mining sector accounts for at least 10% of district
domestic product.20 Column (4) provides evidence that the monsoon rainfall-conflict
relationship is weaker in places with a significant mining sector, especially for conflict
measured by number of casualties. Again, this effect becomes significantly weaker
19These data are not available for all districts that experience conflict. Appendix A.1.1 shows that very
similar results are obtained when using different road construction measures.
20Appendix A.1.2 provides more detailed discussion of the construction of the sector share variable
and of the related results.
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once the the NREGA-monsoon rainfall interaction term is included in column (5).
Lastly, columns (6) and (7) also control for the IAP discussed in the previous para-
graph. Columns (8) and (9) combine all additional controls. Overall, none of these
additional controls that may conceivably account for the change in the rainfall-conflict
relationship since NREGA’s introduction appear to be absorbing any significant vari-
ation. The main coefficients of interest on the monsoon season rainfall and NREGA
interaction remain intact.
3.4 Heterogeneity of the NREGA Effect
Given that NREGA was rolled out in three different phases, and that early phase
districts were more likely to be part of the Maoist-affected red corridor, I present two
heterogeneity exercises along these two dimensions. The results are presented in Table
8. Panel A presents the baseline results for reference. Panel B explores the hetero-
geneity by NREGA implementation phase. Column (1) in panel B suggests that the
poorest phase 1 and 2 districts drive the moderation in the monsoon rainfall-conflict
relationship. This is not surprising; these are the districts in which the relationship was
initially most pronounced.21 This maps well onto the findings of the existing literature,
which suggests that the economic effects of NREGA are concentrated in districts that
received NREGA early (Imbert and Papp, 2015).
Panel C explores the effect inside and outside the red corridor (which is plotted on
the left panel of Figure 1). The results suggest, that the moderation in the monsoon
rainfall and conflict relationship is coming from these districts. Around 54.7% of the
conflict events take place in these districts; this maps well onto the findings of Vanden
Eynde (2016) and Gawande et al. (2017).
4 Does NREGA Provide Insurance?
I next study whether and to what extent NREGA participation responds to adverse
monsoon seasons. To do this, I leverage both administrative and survey-based data.
Monsoon-induced NREGA take-up The empirical specification used to study NREGA
participation follows closely the approach outlined in the previous sections:
Pdt = δdk + bp(d),r(d),t + φ× log(Rd,t−1) + edt (4)
21Appendix Figures A4 and A5 present the results graphically, highlighting that common trends also
hold when considering NREGA implementation phase and when contrasting districts in the red corridor.
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where Pdt measures participation levels in district d in year t. I focus on three measures
of participation: the total expenditure per capita, the number of days worked per per-
son, and the share of households that demand employment in a district.22 As before,
I control for region by NREGA phase-specific non-linear time effects and district fixed
effects.23 The timing of the monsoon measure is lagged and thus follows the approach
in the previous sections. This is the natural approach given that the bulk of NREGA
employment falls into the lean season (see Figure 3). The coefficient of interest is φ.
We would expect a negative coefficient, φ < 0, indicating that a good monsoon in the
last agricultural cycle (i.e. high income), is correlated with low demand for NREGA.
A negative coefficient is thus suggestive evidence that households rely on NREGA
employment as a form of insurance.
Results from this analysis are presented in Table 9. Panel A presents the baseline
results, exploring three margins of take-up: expenditure per capita, number of days
worked per capita, and the share of households participating. Throughout, the indi-
cators suggest that measures of NREGA take-up strongly counteract monsoon shocks.
There is some indication, albeit not across all estimates and outcomes, that the relation-
ship is more precisely estimated when studying districts that received NREGA funds
in phase 1 (see Panel B), and/or districts that are part of the red corridor (see Panel C).
This is not inconsistent with the previous results that suggested that the moderation
in the monsoon rainfall-and-conflict relationship is driven by these districts.
Appendix Figure A6 studies non-linearities: demand for NREGA work is increas-
ing following a low monsoon rainfall, but also following excessive monsoon rainfall,
further highlighting the role that NREGA may play in providing insurance. Appendix
Table A7 studies survey-based micro data from the second wave of the IDHS household
panel. It shows a similar relationship, suggesting increased participation following a
bad monsoon.24
22The dependent variable here is not transformed in logs as in some district-years there is zero demand.
The estimated coefficients can be interpreted as semi-elasticities.
23The only difference is that I allow the district fixed effects dk to change discretely once from 2010
onward. This is necessary because NREGA data recording changes discretely, which generates district-
specific jumps. This includes variable redefinitions and other public programs that are subsumed under
NREGA and are specific to districts. Appendix B.9 provides further detail.
24Further, Appendix Table A7 suggests that, while rationing of NREGA is prevalent, the extent of
rationing is not correlated with monsoon rainfall. Rather, rationing is most pronounced during periods
when overall demand for NREGA work is low (i.e., following a good monsoon). This is could be driven
by the fact that drawing up NREGA public works projects involves fixed costs that panchayats may not
be willing to incur if overall demand is low.
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How much insurance does NREGA provide? To study this question, I explore how
total NREGA expenditure per capita Pdt moves with variation in lagged agricultural
output value per capita, yd,t−1, with the latter instrumented by the lagged monsoon
shock log(Rd,t−1).
Pdt = δdk + bp(d),r(d),t + ξ × ŷd,t−1 + νdt (5)
I expect that the estimated coefficient ξ in specification 5 is negative, ξ < 0, indicating
that high levels of agricultural output are associated with low NREGA expenditures.
Since the scales are identical, there is a natural interpretation for the estimated coeffi-
cient ξ: it captures (in rupees) the increase in NREGA expenditures in a given district
for every one-rupee loss in agricultural output due to a bad monsoon. The results from
this simple quantification exercise are presented in Table 10. Column (1) shows how
monsoon rainfall is associated with agricultural output per capita. The coefficient on
monsoon rainfall shows a semi-elasticity, indicating that a 10% increase in the mon-
soon rainfall increases the nominal agricultural-output value by 89.7 rupees. This can
be interpreted as the first stage of the analysis. The coefficient in column (2) is as in the
previous table. In column (3), I present the results from an instrumental variables ex-
ercise. Here, lagged agricultural output is instrumented with lagged monsoon rainfall.
The coefficient suggests that a 100-rupee loss in agricultural output due to monsoon
variation translates into an increased NREGA expenditure of 19.6 rupees. Though this
is not full insurance, it suggests that a significant share of agricultural output losses -
around 20% - is offset by NREGA resources flowing into a district.
This estimate is likely a lower bound for several reasons. First, the estimate captures
the direct financial offset in the rainfall-induced reduction in agricultural output value
per capita, which is compensated by NREGA transfers flowing into a district. Yet,
individuals benefiting from NREGA most likely are neither full residual claimants
of the output nor full residual claimants of output losses (see Banerjee et al., 2002).
Further, the output value should capture multiple factor payments, such as rental
payment for land, payments for agricultural labor used in the production of the output,
and other input costs, such as fertilizers and seeds. This means that expressing the
insurance value as output losses compensated by inflows of NREGA resources does
not say a lot about the actual insurance value to individual households. Third, as I
have previously shown, the outside option offered by NREGA can provide insurance
and can make household incomes less rainfall elastic even without direct program
participation as NREGA establishes a rigid minimum-wage floor. I next exploit a
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two-period household panel that provides further evidence that household incomes of
agricultural wage workers in rural areas have become much less dependent on rainfall
since the introduction of NREGA.
NREGA’s impact at the household level Using data from both rounds of the Indian
Human Development Survey (IDHS), I study to what extent household incomes in
rural areas are rainfall elastic and to what extent this elasticity has changed between the
first and second survey waves (in between which NREGA was introduced). I estimate
very similar specifications to those presented in the main results on agricultural output
and wages, except that the observation is now an individual household i.
The results are presented in Table 11. The first three columns present results study-
ing the whole population of survey participants in rural areas in both IDHS waves.
For the population at large, household incomes are rainfall elastic and continue to be
rainfall elastic between the two survey waves; a 1% decrease in monsoon rainfall being
associated with 0.16% lower household incomes. Columns (3)-(6) focus on the subset
of households whose main source of income is agricultural labor. For this subpopula-
tion, a 1% reduction in monsoon rainfall is associated with a 0.26% drop in household
incomes before NREGA was introduced; by contrast, after the introduction of NREGA
the pass through of monsoon rainfall to wages becomes significantly weaker. This
highlights that, while the income-generating process for the public at large remains
a function of monsoon rainfall, the monsoon-rainfall induced income risk for agri-
cultural workers has been significantly reduced. This is particularly relevant because
agricultural workers are among the households with poorest outside options, earning
an average 40,994 rupees per year (around USD 560) in the IDHS sample. In compari-
son, the average household income for the rest of the sample is 92,191 rupees (around
USD 1,261), more than twice as high. As NREGA de facto establishes a rigid lower
wage floor, the finding that the poorest households with the worst outside options are
most likely to benefit from this wage floor is unsurprising.
The analysis suggests that incomes of agricultural day laborers has become much
less rainfall elastic. The NREGA benefit of income stabilization operates both directly
- through NREGA participation - and indirectly - through the program’s general equi-
librium effects on rural labor markets (as previously documented). The next section
presents results suggesting that NREGA has caused a reduction in conflict levels in
districts in which NREGA provides insurance against monsoon shocks.
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5 Does NREGA’s insurance reduce conflict levels?
5.1 Empirical Strategy
I next provide more direct evidence to shed light on the question of whether
NREGA’s provision of insurance against monsoon rainfall-induced income variation
contributes to lower levels of conflict. To do so, I construct a cross-sectional measure
capturing whether demand for NREGA work is decreasing in the extent of monsoon
rainfall. I then examine whether this measure is associated with lower levels of conflict
following the introduction of NREGA. To arrive at such a district-specific measure, I
estimate a heterogenous effects version of the NREGA participation specification equa-
tion 6, allowing for a separate coefficient φd for every district:
Pdt = δdk + bp(d),r(d),t +∑
d
φd × log(Rd,t−1) + edt (6)
The coefficients φd capture the responsiveness of demand for NREGA employment
with respect to monsoon rainfall in each district d. I estimate the above specification
and retain both the point estimate φ̂d as well as the estimated standard error ̂s.e.(φ̂d),
computing the ratio T̂d =
φ̂d
̂s.e.(φ̂d)
. I then convert the variable into a dummy variable
1(φ̂d) taking the value equal to one, if the the T̂d is in the lower 20th percentile of
the empirical distribution among all the estimates T̂d. This incorporates the degree of
uncertainty or precision of different φ̂d estimates, but does not involve a comparison
with some hypothetical statistical distribution.25 As before, I explore three measures of
NREGA participation: expenditure per capita, days worked per capita, and the share
of households demanding employment to construct the 1(φ̂d). I use this cross-sectional
measure for a difference-in-differences estimation, comparing conflict levels in districts
in which NREGA counteracts monsoon rainfall-induced income variation to those in
which this insurance effect was not statistically discernible. I estimate:
E(Adt) = ad exp [ψ× Tdt × 1(φ̂d) + bp(d),r(d),t +ωdt] (7)
As before, Adt indicates the number of conflict events or casualties in a district and
calendar year. The coefficient of interest is ψ; a negative coefficient, ψ < 0, indicates
that districts in which NREGA cushions monsoon shocks experience a relative drop
in conflict levels compared to places in which NREGA does not have this insurance
function. The specification includes time effects specific to the NREGA implementation
25To be precise, since the estimated values φˆd are, on average, negative indicating that demand for
NREGA is deceasing in rainfall, I flip the sign for ease of interpretation.
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phase, which, as before, ensures that I do not exploit any variation across NREGA
implementation phases to estimate ψ. The main concern for this analysis is whether
common trends hold. I show that places in which demand for NREGA is responsive to
local monsoon rainfall only start experiencing lower levels of conflict reliably and in a
timely fashion around the introduction of NREGA. This provides compelling evidence
in support of the common trends assumption.
5.2 Results
In Table 12, I present results from the difference-in-differences analysis, which ex-
ploits heterogeneity across districts in the extent to which households’ demand for
NREGA is a decreasing function of monsoon rainfall. Panel A presents the overall
effect across all districts. Throughout, the coefficient is negative and, in most speci-
fications, significantly different from zero. This suggests that conflict levels go down
in places in which demand for NREGA increases following a low monsoon rainfall.
The size of the coefficient is economically meaningful: across the specifications in
Panel A, the coefficient hovers between -0.6 to -0.8, indicating that the difference in
the logs of expected counts is expected to be 0.6 to 0.8 log points lower in districts
in which NREGA participation offsets local monsoon shocks. This translates to a
significant, 40%-50% drop in conflict levels. Panel B explores this effect by NREGA-
implementation phase. Again, though estimated with less precision, the results appear
to be more concentrated in districts that received NREGA in Phase 1. Lastly, Panel C
explores the heterogeneity of the effect, comparing districts forming the red corridor,
with districts outside the red corridor. Again, the results suggest that those districts
experience drops in conflict levels. The estimated coefficient suggests that the differ-
ence in the logs of expected counts of conflict is expected to be one log point lower
for districts inside the red corridor, where demand for NREGA is responsive to local
monsoon variation. This translates into a relative drop in conflict levels of around 60%.
Robustness Appendix Table A9 presents the results obtained when coding the dummy
to take the value of one, in case the estimated coefficient φd is in the lower 10th or 30th
percentile distribution of the estimated T̂d. The results are very similar to the main re-
sults. In Appendix Table A10, I use the level φ̂d and weigh observations by the inverse
of the estimated standard error ̂s.e.(φ̂d). The results are similar to those obtained with
the dummified measure.
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Common trends The natural concern with this analysis is that districts in which de-
mand for NREGA responds to monsoon rainfall may have been on differential trends
before NREGA was introduced. Figure 6 suggests that this is not likely to be the case.
Conflict falls in districts where NREGA demand is responding to monsoon rainfall,
but only after NREGA was introduced, suggesting that these places have not been on
differential trends in conflict prior to the introduction of NREGA.
Where does NREGA provide insurance? The degree to which φd is negative may
depend on many factors. In order to shed some light onto what drives variation in
the φd, I use a a hands-off machine-learning approach called best subset selection to
help identify the vector variables that do a good job in characterizing what drives the
variation in the measure 1(φ̂d). The best subset selection (BSS) method I employ finds
the solution to the following non-convex combinatorial optimization problem:
minβ∑
d
(1(φ̂d)− β0 −
p
∑
j=1
xdjβ j)2 subject to
p
∑
j=1
I(β j 6= 0) ≤ s, (8)
where p is the set of regressors of which a subset s is chosen to maximize overall model
fit. The idea is to find the best model among all potential models to identify the vector
of covariates that does the best job in capturing variation in the 1(φ̂d). The result is
a sequence of models M1, ...,Ms, ..,Mp, where Ms indicates the best model among
the class of models including exactly s covariates. The overall optimal model among
the sequence of best models, Ms∗, is chosen by using either cross validation or some
degree-of-freedom-adjusted measure of goodness of fit such as the Akaike information
criterion (AIC).26 I consider a rich set of 31 cross-sectional district characteristics for BSS
to chose from. This includes the full set of baseline characteristics from the 2001 Census
explored in the summary statistics Table 1; further, I include the NREGA treatment
tranche indicator, whether a district is part of the red corridor, and district-specific
measures that capture the degree to which agricultural output or agricultural wages
are a function of rainfall prior to the introduction of NREGA. These are constructed in a
similar fashion as the φd’s. Lastly, I also include measures of the share of a district area
that has lit pixels using night lights data and whether a district would be selected to
be receiving special IAP assistance funding.
The decomposition of what drives the variation across the 1(φ̂d) is presented in
26An alternative method would be to use Lasso, which is more widely known and can handle problems
when the set of covariates to consider is large; the main drawback is that BSS becomes computationally
infeasible very fast (with more than 40 covariates).
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Appendix Table A8. I present the first twelve “best” models M1, ...,M12. The twelfth
model is the one that, using the AIC criterion, is judged to perform best among all
feasible models in navigating the bias-variance trade-off. Some of the district charac-
teristics that seem to explain the variation in the 1(φ̂d) are quite intuitive. In particular,
both measures capturing the extent to which agricultural wages or agricultural out-
put per capita are a function of monsoon rainfall prior to NREGA’s introduction are
increasing the likelihood that a district’s NREGA demand appears responsive to mon-
soon rainfall. This is very intuitive, as one would expect that the insurance value
of NREGA is largest in places where the income-generating process is most affected
by monsoon rainfall. Further, the results suggest that the dummy variable indicating
whether a district is inside the red corridor is, not surprisingly, also a characteristic that
seems to matter. Some other census characteristics are more difficult to interpret. The
tribal population share, along with other measures that may be considered to capture
low baseline level of development (such as low prevalence of primary school facili-
ties, a high gender gap or high illiteracy rates), are correlated with the 1(φ̂d) indicator
capturing whether NREGA participation appears responsive to monsoon variation.
The results thus indicate that NREGA does provide insurance in the places where
demand for that insurance is likely highest. Further, a measure that reasonably cap-
tures whether NREGA demand is responding to monsoon rainfall is significantly as-
sociated with lower levels of conflict, after the introduction of NREGA. This is further
evidence that the observed reduced-form weakening of the monsoon season rainfall-
conflict relationship and ensuing lower levels of conflict are due to NREGA’s provision
of insurance against adverse income shocks.
6 Conclusion
This paper has studied the impact of a social insurance program on conflict in India.
The existing conflict literature has devised various identification strategies to exploit
exogenous variations in incomes to study the relationship between income and conflict.
The findings of this literature have a direct policy implication: any measure that helps
insulate household incomes from adverse shocks should moderate the relationship
between these exogenous productivity shocks and conflict.
The key findings of this paper suggest that a large scale public employment pro-
gram in India has eliminated the previously existing relationship between monsoon
rainfall and conflict. While weather shocks continue to affect rural areas, these shocks
have ceased to translate into conflict as a result of having the public employment
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program in place. The insurance value delivered by the public employment scheme
is significant. A simple quantification exercise suggests that at least 20% of district-
level income losses due to adverse monsoon conditions are directly offset by the in-
creased expenditures the program provides. I show that districts where NREGA offsets
monsoon-induced income losses experience significant drops in conflict levels.
The paper has important implications for policy makers. Incomes in developing
countries are much more volatile, leaving households exposed to significantly more
risk than those in developed countries. Climate models suggest that erratic weather
events could become even more severe and frequent. This has led to concerns about
conflicts in the future (see Hsiang et al., 2013). Many developing countries have not
been able to devise policies to provide adequate protection. This paper highlights
that social insurance in form of a public employment program reduces conflict, thus
delivering social benefits that go beyond mere insurance value.
References
Aggarwal, S. (2014). Do Rural Roads Create Pathways Out of Poverty? Evidence from
India. mimeo.
Annan, J. and C. Blattman (2016). Can Employment Reduce Lawlessness and Rebel-
lion? A Field Experiment with High-Risk Men in a Fragile State. American Political
Science Review 110(01), 1–17.
Banerjee, A., E. Duflo, C. Imbert, S. Mathew, and R. Pande (2017). E-governance,
Accountability, and Leakage in Public Programs: Experimental Evidence from a
Financial Management Reform in India . NBER Working Paper.
Banerjee, A. V., P. J. Gertler, M. Ghatak, S. Journal, and N. April (2002). Empowerment
and Efficiency : Tenancy Reform in West Bengal. Journal of Political Economy 110(2),
239–280.
Bazzi, S. and C. Blattman (2014). Economic Shocks and Conflict: Evidence from Com-
modity Prices. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 6(4), 1–38.
Becker, G. (1968). Crime and punishment: An economic approach. Journal of Political
Economy 76(2), 169–217.
Berg, E., S. Bhattacharyya, D. Rajasekhar, and R. Manjula (2018). Can public works
increase equilibrium wages? Evidence from India’s National Rural Employment
Guarantee. World Development 103, 239–254.
28
Berman, E., J. H. Felter, J. N. Shapiro, and E. Troland (2013). Modest, secure, and in-
formed: Successful development in conflict zones. American Economic Review 103(3),
512–517.
Berman, E., J. Shapiro, and J. Felter (2011). Can hearts and minds be bought? The
economics of counterinsurgency in Iraq. Journal of Political Economy 119(4), 766 – 819.
Besley, T. and S. Coate (1992). Workfare versus welfare: Incentive arguments for work
requirements in poverty-alleviation programs. American Economic Review 82(1), 249–
261.
Besley, T. and T. Persson (2008). The Incidence of Civil War: Theory and Evidence.
NBER Working Paper.
Blattman, C., N. Fiala, and S. Martinez (2014). Generating Skilled Self-Employment in
Developing Countries: Experimental Evidence from Uganda. The Quarterly Journal
of Economics 129(2), 697–752.
Blattman, C. and E. Miguel (2010). Civil War. Journal of Economic Literature 48(1), 3–57.
Boschee, E., J. Lautenschlager, S. O’Brien, S. Shellman, and J. Starz (2018). ICEWS
Automated Daily Event Data.
Bru¨ckner, M. and A. Ciccone (2011). Rain and the Democratic Window of Opportunity.
Econometrica 79(3), 923–947.
Buhaug, H. and G. Wischnath (2014). Rice or riots: On food production and conflict
severity across India. in Press, Political Geography.
Burgess, R., O. Deschenes, D. Donaldson, and M. Greenstone (2014). The Unequal
Effects of Weather and Climate Change: Evidence from Mortality in India. mimeo.
Burgess, R. and D. Donaldson (2010). Can Openness Mitigate the Effects of Weather
Shocks? Evidence from India’s Famine Era. American Economic Review: Papers &
Proceedings 100(2), 449–453.
Burnicki, A. C., D. G. Brown, and P. Goovaerts (2007). Simulating error propagation in
land-cover change analysis: The implications of temporal dependence. Computers,
Environment and Urban Systems 31(3), 282–302.
Chakrabarty, B. and R. K. Kujur (2009). Maoism in India: Reincarnation of Ultra-Left Wing
Extremism in the Twenty-First Century. Delhi: Routledge.
29
Chassang, S. (2009). Economic Shocks and Civil War. Quarterly Journal of Political
Science 4(3), 211–228.
Ciccone, A. (2011). Economic Shocks and Civil Conflict: A Comment. American Eco-
nomic Journal: Applied Economics 3(4), 215–227.
Collier, P. and A. Hoeffler (1998). On economic causes of civil war. Oxford Economic
Papers 50(4), 563–573.
Collier, P. and A. Hoeffler (2004). Greed and grievance in civil war. Oxford Economic
Papers 56(4), 563–595.
Collobert, R., J. Weston, and L. Bottou (2011). Natural language processing (almost)
from scratch. Journal of Machine Learning Research 12, 2461–2505.
Commission on Fragility and Development (2018). Escaping the fragility trap. Techni-
cal Report April.
Conley, T. (1999). GMM estimation with cross sectional dependence. Journal of Econo-
metrics 92(1), 1–45.
Crost, B. and J. Felter (2019). Export Crops and Civil Conflict. forthcoming, Journal of
the European Economics Association.
Crost, B. and P. Johnston (2014). Aid under fire: Development projects and civil conflict.
American Economic Review 104(6), 1833–1856.
Dal Bo´, E. and P. Dal Bo´ (2011). Workers, Warriors, and Criminals: Social Conflict in
General Equilibrium. Journal of the European Economic Association 9(4), 646–677.
Dasgupta, A., K. Gawande, and D. Kapur (2017). (When) Do Antipoverty Programs
Reduce Violence? India’s Rural Employment Guarantee and Maoist Conflict. Inter-
national Organization 71(03), 605–632.
Dash, S. P. (2006). Naxal Movement and State Power: With Special Reference of Orissa (1st
editio ed.). New Delhi: Sarup & Sons.
Desai, S. and R. Vanneman (2018). India Human Development Survey-II (IHDS-II),
2011-12.
Desai, S., P. Vashishtha, and O. Joshi (2015). Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employ-
ment Guarantee Act: A Catalyst for Rural Transformation. IHDS Report.
30
Dube, O. and J. F. Vargas (2013). Commodity Price Shocks and Civil Conflict: Evidence
from Colombia. The Review of Economic Studies 80(4), 1384–1421.
Dutta, P., R. Murgai, M. Ravallion, and D. V. D. Walle (2014). Right to Work?: Assessing
India’s Employment Guarantee Scheme in Bihar.
Fearon, J. D. and D. D. Laitin (2003). Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War. American
Political Science Review 97(01), 75.
Ferrara, E. L. and M. Harari (2018). Conflict, Climate, and Cells: A Disaggregated
Analysis. The Review of Economics and Statistics 100(4), 594–608.
Fetzer, T. and S. Kyburz (2018). Cohesive Institutions and Political Violence. CAGE
Working Paper.
Gawande, K., D. Kapur, and S. Satyanath (2017). Renewable Natural Resource Shocks
and Conflict Intensity. Journal of Conflict Resolution 61(1), 140–172.
Gehrke, E. (2017). An Employment Guarantee as Risk Insurance? Assessing the Ef-
fects of the NREGS on Agricultural Production Decisions. The World Bank Economic
Review (March).
Gomes, J. (2012). The Political Economy of the Maoist Conflict in India: An Empirical
Analysis. mimeo.
Guardado, J. and S. Pennings (2017). The Seasonality of Conflict. mimeo, 1–38.
Hegre, H. and N. Sambanis (2006). Sensitivity Analysis of Empirical Results on Civil
War Onset. Journal of Conflict Resolution 50(4), 508–535.
Hoelscher, K., J. Miklian, and K. C. Vadlamannati (2012). Hearts and mines: A district-
level analysis of the Maoist conflict in India. International Area Studies Review 15(2),
141–160.
Hsiang, S. M., M. Burke, and E. Miguel (2013). Quantifying the influence of climate on
human conflict. Science 341(6151), 1–7.
Imbert, C. and J. Papp (2015). Labor Market Effects of Social Programs: Evidence from
India’s Employment Guarantee. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 7(2),
233–263.
Iyengar, R., J. Monten, and M. Hanson (2011). Building Peace: The Impact of Aid on
the Labor Market for Insurgents. NBER Working Paper 17297.
31
Iyer, L. and P. Topalova (2014). Poverty and Crime : Evidence from Rainfall and Trade
Shocks in India. Harvard Business School Working Paper 14067.
Jayachandran, S. (2006). Selling labor low: Wage responses to productivity shocks in
developing countries. Journal of Political Economy 114(3), 538–575.
Katyal, R., M. Sardana, and D. Satyanarayana (2001). Estimates of District Domestic
Product. New Delhi: Socio-Economic Research Centre.
Kaur, S. (2018). Nominal wage rigidity in village labor markets. forthcoming, American
Economic Review.
Khanna, G. and L. Zimmermann (2017). Guns and butter? Fighting violence with the
promise of development. Journal of Development Economics 124, 120–141.
Kudamatsu, M., T. Persson, and D. Stro¨mberg (2014). Weather and Infant Mortality in
Africa. mimeo.
Leetaru, K. and P. A. Schrodt (2014). GDELT: Global data on events, location, and tone.
International Studies Association meetings.
Leung, Y., Y. Ge, J. Ma, and J. Wang (2005). Measurement Errors and their Propaga-
tion in the Registration of Remote Sensing Images. In Developments in Spatial Data
Handling, pp. 285–297. Springer Berlin Heidelberg.
Li, X.-H., Q. Zhang, and C.-Y. Xu (2012). Suitability of the TRMM satellite rainfalls in
driving a distributed hydrological model for water balance computations in Xinjiang
catchment, Poyang lake basin. Journal of Hydrology 426-427, 28–38.
Manning, C. D., P. Raghavan, and H. Schu¨tze (2008). Introduction to Information Re-
trieval. New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.
Miguel, E., S. Satyanath, and E. Sergenti (2004). Economic shocks and civil conflict: An
instrumental variables approach. Journal of Political Economy 112(4), 725–753.
Ministry of Rural Development (2009). Joint Convergence Guideline. Technical report,
Ministry of Rural Development.
Morgan, R. and D. Reiter (2013). How War Makes the State: Insurgency, External
Threat, and Road Construction in India. mimeo.
32
Muralidharan, K., P. Niehaus, and S. Sukhtankar (2016). Building state capacity: Ev-
idence from biometric smartcards in Indi. American Economic Review 106(10), 2895–
2929.
Muralidharan, K., P. Niehaus, and S. Sukhtankar (2017). General Equilibrium Effects
of (Improving) Public Employment Programs: Experimental Evidence from India.
NBER Working Paper, 1–76.
Nichols, A. and R. Zeckhauser (1982). Targeting Transfers through Restrictions on
Recipients. American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings 72(2), 372–377.
Niehaus, P. and S. Sukhtankar (2013a). Corruption Dynamics: The Golden Goose
Effect. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 5(4), 230–269.
Niehaus, P. and S. Sukhtankar (2013b). The marginal rate of corruption in public
programs: Evidence from India. Journal of Public Economics 104, 52–64.
Nunn, N. and N. Qian (2014). US food aid and civil conflict. American Economic
Review 104(6), 1630–1666.
Radhakrishna, R. and S. Ray (Eds.) (2006). Handbook of Poverty in India: Perspectives,
Policies, and Programmes. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Ramana, P. V. (2007). The Naxal Challenge: Causes, Linkages, and Policy Options (1st editio
ed.). Chennai: Pearson.
Ranjan, R. and V. Prasad (2012). Exploring Social Resilience in State Fragility: A Cli-
mate Change Perspective. In M. Hamza and C. Corendea (Eds.), Climate Change and
Fragile States: Rethinking Adaptation, Number 16, Chapter 2. Bonn: United Nations
University.
Sarsons, H. (2015). Rainfall and conflict: A cautionary tale. Journal of Development
Economics 115, 62–72.
Schneider, U., A. Becker, P. Finger, B. Meyer-Christoffer, Anja; Rudolf, and M. Ziese
(2011). GPCC Full Data Reanalysis Version 6.0 at 0.5 Degree: Monthly Land-Surface
Precipitation from Rain-Gauges built on GTS-based and Historic Data.
Sekhri, S. and A. Storeygard (2014). Dowry deaths: Response to weather variability in
India. Journal of Development Economics 111, 212–223.
33
Shapiro, J. N., M. Callen, E. Berman, and J. Felter (2011). Do Working Men Rebel?
Insurgency and Unemployment in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Philippines. Journal of
Conflict Resolution 55(4), 496–528.
Shrivastava, A. (2014). Civil conflict with rising wages and increasing state capacity:
The Maoist insurgency in India. mimeo.
Smith, S. R., M. A. Bourassa, and M. Long (2011). Pirate attacks affect Indian Ocean
climate research. Eos, Transactions American Geophysical Union 92(27), 225.
Srivastava, A. (2006). Maoism in India. Delhi: Prabhat Prakashan.
Vanden Eynde, O. (2016). Targets of Violence: Evidence from India’s Naxalite Conflict.
The Economic Journal (November), 1–50.
Verma, S. (2011). Far Reaching Consequences of the Naxalite Problem in India. Tech-
nical Report July, Rakshak Foundation.
34
Figure 1: Maps of districts across India
Panel A: Red Corridor Panel B: Conflict Intensity
Panel C: Districts by NREGA Phase Panel D: NREGA Demand monsoon responsive
Notes: Panel A plots out districts in the “red corridor” according to Government of India, Panel B presents conflict intensity
measured by total number of events in the SATP corpus, Panel C highlights the different phases of NREGA roll out, while Panel
D plots out districts where demand for NREGA is estimated to be responsive to local monsoon variation.
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Figure 2: Total Number of Conflict events by NREGA implementation phase.
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Figure 3: Rainfall (dashed), growing season and NREGA employment (solid line) in 2011-2012
by month for Andhra Pradesh
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Figure 4: Effect of monsoon rainfall on conflict over time relative to the NREGA introduction
Panel A: Total Number of Events Panel B: Casualties
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Notes: The vertical line indicates the NREGA introduction date. The blue solid lines indicate the coefficients for the pre- and post NREGA period obtained from a simple regression interacting lagged Monsoon
rainfall with the NREGA treatment indicator. The red line are each point estimates of the relationship between lagged monsoon rainfall and conflict. 95% confidence bands are indicated as dotted black lines.
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Figure 5: Non-parametric estimates of effect of monsoon rain on agricultural output per capita, wages and conflict before and after the introduction of
NREGA.
Panel A: Before NREGA
Panel B: After NREGA
Notes: Figure plots non-parametric local linear regressions using the watercolor vizualization method as introduced in Hsiang et al. (2013): 95% confidence bands are indicated as dashed lines. Note that for both
panels, the scales are identical, which allows a direct comparison. Data on the dependent variables (agricultural output per capita, wages and conflict events) as well as the independent variable monsoon rainfall has
been demeaned, removing both district fixed effects as well as region by NREGA phase by time effects. The green line indicates the OLS fit, while the solid white line indicates the median bootstrapped non-linear
curve.
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Figure 6: Difference-in-Differences effect of the estimated NREGA monsoon rainfall elasticity on conflict levels relative to the NREGA introduction date
Panel A: Total Number of Events Panel B: Casualties
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Notes: The vertical line indicates the NREGA introduction date. The connected red dots are the point estimates of the interaction between the estimated district specific monsoon induced NREGA participation
measure 1(φ̂d) estimated off the NREGA expenditure per district and year and the time to NREGA treatment indicator. 95% confidence bands obtained from clustering at the district level are indicated as dotted
black lines.
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Table 1: Comparing District Characteristics Across NREGA Implementation Phases
Overall Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3
Mean Mean p Mean p Mean p
Panel A: Conflict
Red Corridor 0.379 0.559 0.000 0.375 0.911 0.228 0.000
(0.486) (0.498) *** (0.486) (0.421) ***
Conflict Events 1.477 1.894 0.128 1.645 0.679 1.033 0.040
(4.542) (5.044) (5.232) (3.578) **
Casualties 2.702 3.660 0.079 2.719 0.983 1.874 0.042
(8.786) (10.384) * (10.358) (5.867) **
Panel B: Income
Agricultural Output/Capita [INR] 320.722 219.651 0.000 268.988 0.163 433.085 0.000
(453.169) (292.799) *** (419.184) (548.632) ***
Agricultural Wage [INR] 69.932 52.586 0.000 67.559 0.521 84.593 0.000
(36.712) (15.773) *** (34.650) (42.859) ***
Lit Pixels [share] 0.522 0.383 0.000 0.455 0.008 0.675 0.000
(0.335) (0.300) *** (0.302) *** (0.319) ***
Panel C: Climate
Monsoon Temperature 25.860 25.727 0.591 26.405 0.094 25.686 0.391
(4.104) (4.526) (4.013) * (3.750)
Annual Rain 1343.459 1357.093 0.710 1471.326 0.016 1264.499 0.025
(677.649) (586.596) (648.074) ** (753.074) **
Monsoon Rain 961.201 1016.019 0.035 1048.984 0.020 868.116 0.000
(481.958) (412.287) ** (465.144) ** (529.685) ***
Drought Severity -0.198 -0.215 0.241 -0.211 0.429 -0.177 0.068
(0.231) (0.262) (0.195) (0.220) *
Panel D: Socio-Economic
Illiterate [share] 0.465 0.523 0.000 0.471 0.572 0.413 0.000
(0.120) (0.106) *** (0.129) (0.103) ***
Household Size 5.432 5.390 0.371 5.519 0.194 5.421 0.802
(0.827) (0.801) (0.846) (0.838)
Population younger than 6 [share] 0.250 0.261 0.000 0.253 0.282 0.240 0.000
(0.034) (0.026) *** (0.033) (0.037) ***
Population growth 1991-2001 22.087 21.599 0.373 24.463 0.021 21.253 0.116
(10.540) (8.095) (13.551) ** (10.445)
Gender Gap [per 1000 people] 22.316 24.978 0.000 21.548 0.235 20.443 0.000
(7.450) (5.785) *** (8.242) (7.641) ***
Panel E: Infrastructure
Primary School [share] 0.832 0.807 0.006 0.821 0.361 0.859 0.001
(0.156) (0.155) *** (0.151) (0.156) ***
Mudroad [share] 0.630 0.680 0.001 0.656 0.217 0.573 0.000
(0.268) (0.239) *** (0.267) (0.281) ***
Permanent Housing [share] 0.463 0.360 0.000 0.434 0.098 0.567 0.000
(0.237) (0.205) *** (0.210) * (0.233) ***
Primary Health Care Centre [share] 0.391 0.321 0.000 0.373 0.320 0.461 0.000
(0.250) (0.220) *** (0.228) (0.266) ***
Electricity [share] 0.801 0.685 0.000 0.782 0.349 0.909 0.000
(0.252) (0.296) *** (0.236) (0.154) ***
Bus Stop [share] 0.444 0.334 0.000 0.397 0.052 0.564 0.000
(0.320) (0.286) *** (0.293) * (0.320) ***
Postal Office [share] 0.490 0.373 0.000 0.465 0.230 0.603 0.000
(0.274) (0.236) *** (0.252) (0.272) ***
Panel F: NREGA
Household Participating [share] 0.390 0.435 0.065 0.470 0.120 0.310 0.001
(0.490) (0.311) * (0.682) (0.487) ***
Expenditure / Capita [INR] 541.045 595.253 0.196 678.879 0.121 422.020 0.006
(848.051) (540.597) (1177.619) (847.342) ***
Days Worked / Capita 3.494 4.016 0.048 4.142 0.212 2.704 0.003
(5.197) (3.668) ** (6.786) (5.281) ***
Notes: This table presents cross-sectional summary statistics at the district level. All time-varying variables are
district level means, computed as an average for the period prior to NREGA, with the exception of the NREGA
participation data in Panel F. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The p-value are from a comparison
of the respective covariate for district within an implementation phase, with all the other districts not in that
implementation phase. Socio-economic and district Infrastructure statistics based on the 2001 Census for India.
Infrastructure statistics is the share of villages in a district with access to a particular type of infrastructure.
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Table 2: Reduced Form Relationship between Monsoon, Agricultural Production, Wages and
Violence
Agricultural Income Conflict
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Output/Capita) ln(Wage) Events Casualties
log(Monsoont) 0.325*** 0.058**
(0.066) (0.024)
NREGA x log(Monsoont) -0.100 -0.085***
(0.078) (0.027)
log(Monsoont−1) -1.402*** -1.406***
(0.271) (0.367)
NREGA x log(Monsoont−1) 1.298*** 1.361***
(0.323) (0.401)
Joint Test:
log(Monsoon)+ NREGA x log(Monsoon) = 0 .225*** -.027 -.103 -.045
(.0864) (.0298) (.155) (.323)
Observations 5507 3043 3522 3435
Number of Districts 471 371 239 239
Estimation OLS OLS Poisson Poisson
Notes: All regressions include region by NREGA phase and time effects and district fixed effects. Columns (1) and
(2) study agricultural output and wages on an unbalanced annual district level panel from 1999-2011 and 1998-2010
respectively, using contemporaneous monsoon rainfall as independent variable. Columns (3) and (4) are estimated
using a pseudo maximum likelihood poisson estimator, on a balanced district level annual panel from 2000- 2014.
The dependent variables are number of conflict events and number of casualties. Note that district numbers for
poisson model reflect the number of districts over the sample period for which there is variation in the dependent
variable. For columns (1)-(2) standard errors are adjusted to reflect spatial dependence as modeled in Conley (1999).
Spatial autocorrelation is assumed to linearly decrease in distance up to a cutoff of 500 km. Poisson regressions
present standard errors clustered at the district level, stars indicate *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 3: Decomposition of casualties and arrests: the impact of NREGA
Baseline results Casualty types Arrests No casualty events
Events Casualties Civilians Security forces Militants
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
log(Monsoont−1) -1.402*** -1.406*** -1.210** -1.800*** -1.820*** -1.142*** -1.167***
(0.271) (0.367) (0.573) (0.376) (0.556) (0.342) (0.306)
NREGA x log(Monsoont−1) 1.298*** 1.361*** 0.827* 1.792*** 2.214*** 0.886** 1.207***
(0.323) (0.401) (0.471) (0.437) (0.611) (0.350) (0.334)
Observations 3522 3435 2720 2503 2215 2961 3241
Number of Districts 239 239 202 176 159 209 221
Notes: All regressions include region-phase-time effects in addition to the district fixed effects. The different outcome measures are counts indicated in
the column head, all regressions are estimated using a pseudo maximum likelihood poisson estimator. Standard errors clustered at the district level, stars
indicate *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Table 4: Robustness to of NREGA Effect to different empirical models or the inclusion of other fixed effects or
controls.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Events
log(Monsoont−1) -1.402*** -0.683*** -0.867*** -1.397*** -1.438***
(0.271) (0.227) (0.214) (0.254) (0.288)
NREGA x log(Monsoont−1) 1.298*** 0.534** 0.903*** 1.293*** 1.291***
(0.323) (0.260) (0.245) (0.306) (0.340)
Joint Test:
Pre NREGA + Post NREGA = 0 -.103 -.15 .037 -.104 -.147
(.155) (.171) (.128) (.152) (.182)
Panel B: Casualties
log(Monsoont−1) -1.406*** -0.883* -1.231*** -1.399*** -1.265***
(0.367) (0.478) (0.359) (0.348) (0.358)
NREGA x log(Monsoont−1) 1.361*** 0.624 1.314*** 1.352*** 1.285***
(0.401) (0.439) (0.457) (0.385) (0.375)
Joint Test:
Pre NREGA + Post NREGA = 0 -.045 -.259 .083 -.047 .02
(.323) (.348) (.317) (.317) (.304)
District FE X X X X X
Region x NREGA Phase x Year X X X X .
Other controls None State x Year FE District x NREGA District Lin. Trend Region x Year FE
Notes: All regressions include district fixed effects. Columns (1) - (4) all include region by NREGA phase by year time effects, while
column (5) includes region by year FE and the NREGA treatment indicator. District X NREGA indicates a different set of district fixed
effects for the period after NREGA was rolled out in a district. Standard errors are clustered at the district levels, stars indicate *** p < 0.01,
** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 5: Robustness to controlling for state level police strength: Impact of NREGA on relationship between monsoon rainfall and conflict
Events Casualties
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
log(Monsoont−1) -0.985*** -1.031*** -0.963*** -0.978*** -1.013*** -1.364*** -1.393*** -1.366*** -1.255*** -1.270***
(0.256) (0.249) (0.246) (0.244) (0.239) (0.450) (0.441) (0.431) (0.415) (0.400)
NREGA x log(Monsoont−1) 1.029*** 1.147*** 1.129*** 1.076*** 1.089*** 1.176*** 1.307*** 1.332*** 1.193*** 1.175***
(0.298) (0.283) (0.267) (0.258) (0.255) (0.418) (0.416) (0.407) (0.406) (0.403)
Civil Police strength -0.044*** -0.043*** -0.041*** -0.041*** -0.041*** -0.051** -0.051** -0.050** -0.053*** -0.054***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.012) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.020) (0.020)
NREGA x Civil Police strength 0.013** 0.013** 0.012** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.015** 0.014** 0.014* 0.015** 0.016**
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Armed Police strength -0.004 -0.003 -0.005 -0.008 -0.029 -0.038 -0.036 -0.038
(0.035) (0.038) (0.037) (0.038) (0.046) (0.050) (0.051) (0.054)
NREGA x Armed Police strength 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.021 0.025 0.022 0.021
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.021)
Number of Police stations 0.015** 0.016*** 0.015** 0.018** 0.020** 0.021**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
NREGA x Number of Police stations -0.006** -0.007** -0.007** -0.006 -0.009** -0.010**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Number of Police outposts 0.002 0.002* 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
NREGA x Number of Police outposts 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Number of Armed batallions 0.053 -0.010
(0.073) (0.156)
NREGA x Number of Armed batallions 0.009 0.063
(0.052) (0.095)
Observations 2439 2440 2441 2441 2441 2226 2226 2226 2226 2226
Number of Districts 229 229 229 229 229 214 214 214 214 214
Notes: All regressions include region-phase-time effects and district fixed effects. The dependent variable throughout is the number of conflict events. Standard errors are
clustered at the district level, with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 6: Alternative Mechanism: Integrated Action Plan disbursals and the moderation of monsoon
rainfall and conflict relationship
IAP Events Casualties
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
log(Monsoont−1) 0.234 -1.307*** -1.173*** -1.354*** -1.524*** -1.466*** -1.563***
(0.214) (0.254) (0.207) (0.278) (0.374) (0.354) (0.336)
NREGA x log(Monsoont−1) 0.977*** 1.136*** 1.024*** 0.776*** 1.340*** 1.389***
(0.290) (0.315) (0.373) (0.296) (0.432) (0.386)
IAP Expenditure 0.084*** 0.055**
(0.029) (0.027)
Joint Test:
log(Monsoon)+ NREGA x log(Monsoon) = 0 -.33* -.037 -.33 -.748** -.126 -.174
(.182) (.278) (.224) (.322) (.384) (.307)
Observations 259 3054 2493 2802 2951 2257 3121
Number of Districts 75 209 232 222 199 215 233
Notes: All regressions include region-phase-time effects and district fixed effects. Regressions (2) - (7) are estimated using
a pseudo maximum likelihood poisson estimator. IAP expenditure data is available from 2010- 2013. Monsoon rain is the
previous growing season’s Monsoon rainfall realization. Column (1) studies IAP expenditure as a function of lagged Monsoon
rain. Columns (2) and (5) remove the 33 districts that received the IAP originally. Columns (3) and (6) restrict the analysis to
the period 2000-2010, before IAP started. Columns (4) and (7) controls for IAP expenditure. Standard errors are clustered at
the district level, with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 7: Ruling out alternative mechanisms
Non-monsoon season PMGSY Roads Mining Sector IAP Expenditure All Combined
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
log(Outside Monsoont−1) -0.152 0.271 0.455**
(0.180) (0.212) (0.219)
NREGA x log(Outside Monsoont−1) 0.133 0.056 -0.215
(0.199) (0.240) (0.248)
log(Monsoont−1) -0.627*** -1.553*** -0.628*** -1.697*** -0.699*** -1.405*** -1.027*** -1.931***
(0.143) (0.226) (0.128) (0.254) (0.130) (0.226) (0.141) (0.204)
NREGA x log(Monsoont−1) 1.443*** 1.504*** 1.160*** 1.539***
(0.255) (0.326) (0.302) (0.244)
Cumulative Roads -11.201*** 1.273 -13.177*** -0.625
(3.606) (2.939) (3.674) (2.972)
Cumulative Roads x log(Monsoon) 1.431*** -0.356 1.728*** -0.077
(0.514) (0.423) (0.530) (0.433)
Mining Sector x log(Monsoon) 1.429 0.793 1.269 1.525
(1.944) (1.697) (2.260) (1.872)
IAP Expenditure -0.624** -0.279 -0.247 0.036
(0.297) (0.301) (0.415) (0.393)
IAP Expenditure x log(Monsoon) 0.102** 0.051 0.045 0.003
(0.042) (0.043) (0.060) (0.057)
Notes: The dependent variable is the number of violent events reported on. All regressions include region by NREGA phase and time effects and district fixed effects and are estimated
using a pseudo maximum likelihood poisson estimator, on a balanced district level annual panel. The number of districts and observation varies across specifications, as not for all
mechanisms explored, data is available for the whole sample period from 2000 - 2014. Column (9) highlights that the results are robust to restricting the samples to the set of districts, for
which data is available on all other mechanisms explored. Standard errors are clustered at the district level, with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 8: Heterogeneity of the NREGA Effect by Implementation Phase
and Inside the Red Corridor
Conflict
(1) (2)
Events Casualties
Panel A: Overall NREGA Effect
log(Monsoont−1) -1.402*** -1.406***
(0.271) (0.367)
NREGA x log(Monsoont−1) 1.298*** 1.361***
(0.323) (0.401)
Joint Test:
-.103 -.045
(0.155) (0.323)
Panel B: By NREGA Phase
Phase 1 x log(Monsoont−1) -2.097*** -1.896***
(0.370) (0.592)
NREGA x Phase 1 * log(Monsoont−1) 2.272*** 2.412***
(0.454) (0.697)
Joint Test: .176 .516
(0.171) (0.378)
Phase 2 x log(Monsoont−1) -1.480** -1.509**
(0.660) (0.689)
NREGA x Phase 2 * log(Monsoont−1) 1.833*** 1.428
(0.620) (0.965)
Joint Test: .353 -.081
(0.259) (0.524)
Phase 3 x log(Monsoont−1) -0.790** -1.298**
(0.384) (0.659)
NREGA x Phase 3 * log(Monsoont−1) 0.061 0.187
(0.344) (0.375)
Joint Test: -.729*** -1.111*
(0.263) (0.601)
Panel C: In Red Corridor
Inside Red Corridor x log(Monsoont−1) -2.158*** -2.148***
(0.264) (0.522)
NREGA x Inside Red Corridor x log(Monsoont−1) 2.455*** 2.943***
(0.337) (0.676)
Joint Test: .297** .794**
(0.148) (0.375)
Outside Red Corridor x log(Monsoont−1) -0.989** -1.409***
(0.384) (0.505)
NREGA x Outside Red Corridor x log(Monsoont−1) 0.363 0.309
(0.321) (0.354)
Joint Test: -.626** -1.1**
(0.255) (0.439)
Notes: All regressions include region by NREGA phase and time effects and district
fixed effects. Regressions are estimated using a pseudo maximum likelihood poisson
estimator, on a balanced district level annual panel from 2000- 2014. The dependent
variables are number of conflict events and number of casualties (fatal and injured).
Joint Test performs F-tests on the joint significance of the sum of the respective pairs of
coefficients. Note that district numbers for poisson model reflect the number of districts
over the sample period for which there dis variation in the dependent variable. Standard
errors clustered at the district level, stars indicate *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 9: Explaining the NREGA Effect: Monsoon Rainfall and NREGA Participation
(1) (2) (3)
Expenditure Person Days Households
Panel A: Overall response
log(Monsoont−1) -108.171** -0.844*** -0.023*
(44.763) (0.322) (0.013)
Panel B: By NREGA Phase
Phase 1 x log(Monsoont−1) -138.605*** -0.811*** -0.046**
(39.300) (0.302) (0.018)
Phase 2 x log(Monsoont−1) -94.845 -1.258 0.001
(116.411) (0.812) (0.019)
Phase 3 x log(Monsoont−1) -82.362* -0.640** -0.014
(43.186) (0.256) (0.019)
Panel C: In the Red Corridor
Inside Red Corridor x log(Monsoont−1) -127.226*** -1.033*** -0.032*
(39.523) (0.294) (0.017)
Outside Red Corridor x log(Monsoont−1) -94.549 -0.715* -0.017
(59.986) (0.410) (0.015)
Mean of DV 547 3.54 .395
Observations 3712 4242 4241
Notes: All regressions include region-phase-time effects and a set of district fixed effects for the period
before 2010 and the period after 2010. Monsoon rain is the previous growing season’s monsoon rainfall
realization. Column (1) studies the total expenditure per capita, column (2) studies the number of days per
capita in a district, while column (3) studies the share of a districts households that participate. Standard
errors are adjusted to reflect spatial dependence as modelled in Conley (1999). Spatial autocorrelation is
assumed to linearly decrease in distance up to a cutoff of 500 km. District distances are computed from
district centroids. stars indicate *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 10: Insurance Value of NREGA: Monsoon Rainfall, Output Losses and NREGA
Expenditures
Output Value/Capita NREGA Expenditure/Capita
(1) (2) (3)
OLS OLS IV
log(Monsoont) 897.813***
(235.687)
log(Monsoont−1) -108.171**
(44.763)
log(Agricultural Output Value/Capitat−1) -0.196***
(0.044)
First Stage 39.4
Observations 5105 3712 1873
Number of Districts 425
Notes: All regressions include region-phase-time effects and district fixed effects. Column (1) relates
monsoon rainfall with agricultural output per capita. Column (2) studies lagged monsoon rainfall
and its effect on levels of NREGA expenditure in a district per capita. Column (3) is an instrumental
variables exercise, instrumenting lagged agricultural output value per capita with lagged monsoon
rainfall. Standard errors are adjusted to reflect spatial dependence as modelled in Conley (1999).
Spatial autocorrelation is assumed to linearly decrease in distance up to a cutoff of 500 km. District
distances are computed from district centroids. stars indicate *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Table 11: Monsoon rainfall and incomes before and after NREGA introduction in rural areas: evidence from
household panel data
log(Household income in last year)
Whole population Agricultural laborers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log(Monsoont−1) 0.157*** 0.161*** 0.187*** 0.261*** 0.273*** 0.184*
(0.041) (0.041) (0.042) (0.072) (0.088) (0.099)
NREGA × log(Monsoont−1) 0.003 0.024 0.004 -0.123** -0.112* -0.167**
(0.040) (0.039) (0.040) (0.061) (0.066) (0.071)
Joint Test:
log(Monsoon)+ NREGA x log(Monsoon) = 0 .16*** .185*** .191*** .138 .162 .016
(.0579) (.0596) (.0607) (.108) (.121) (.131)
Observations 50234 50231 45750 8884 8708 4420
Clusters 263 263 251 246 241 196
Fixed Effect District Village Household District Village Household
Notes: All regressions include region-phase-time effects in addition to the location or household fixed effects indicated in the column.
Standard errors clustered at the district level, stars indicate *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 12: Difference in Difference: NREGA Effect on conflict levels due to insurance
Conflict Events Casualties
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Overall Effect
NREGA x 1(φ̂d) -0.925** -0.629 -0.647** -0.988** -0.824* -0.641
(0.363) (0.399) (0.325) (0.481) (0.476) (0.398)
Panel B: By NREGA Phase
NREGA x Phase 1 x 1(φ̂d) -1.398*** -0.655 -0.872** -1.191** -0.749 -0.704
(0.396) (0.464) (0.377) (0.548) (0.568) (0.447)
NREGA x Phase 2 x 1(φ̂d) 0.668 -0.533 1.128* 0.360 -0.099 1.942*
(0.483) (0.432) (0.626) (0.784) (1.240) (1.063)
NREGA x Phase 3 x 1(φ̂d) -0.189 -0.460 0.080 -0.599 -1.347** -0.842
(0.298) (0.371) (0.294) (0.786) (0.583) (0.641)
Panel C: In the Red Corridor
Inside Red Corridor x NREGA x 1(φ̂d) -1.308*** -0.793* -1.073*** -1.315*** -1.047** -1.065**
(0.366) (0.426) (0.406) (0.508) (0.520) (0.521)
Outside Red Corridor x NREGA x 1(φ̂d) 0.286 0.606 0.359 0.057 0.201 0.147
(0.334) (0.529) (0.235) (0.471) (0.710) (0.314)
Mean of DV 4.55 4.55 4.55 6.88 6.88 6.88
Observations 3522 3522 3522 3435 3435 3435
Number of Districts 239 239 239 239 239 239
φ̂d estimated off NREGA data for Expenditure Person days Households Expenditure Person days Households
Notes: Table presents results from a difference-in-difference exercise, comparing conflict levels in districts, across places where demand for NREGA is
responsive to monsoon rainfall, before and after NREGA was introduced. 1(φ̂d) = 1 in case demand for NREGA is a decreasing function of monsoon rainfall.
All regressions include region-phase-time effects and a set of district fixed effects, which ensures that the difference-in-difference is not identified off variation
across NREGA implementation phases. Regressions are estimated using a pseudo maximum likelihood poisson estimator, on a balanced district level annual
panel from 2000- 2014. The 1(φ̂d) is estimated using data on total expenditure per capita (columns (1) and (3)), the number of days worked per capita (columns
(2) and (5)) and the share of households that demand NREGA work in a district and financial year (column (3) and (6)). Panel A presents the baseline results.
Panel B explores heterogeneity by NREGA implementation phase, while Panel C explores the effect within the Red Corridor. Standard errors clustered at the
district level, stars indicate *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Figures and Tables for the Appendix
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Figure A1: Non-parametric regressions of monsoon rainfall deciles on agricultural output per capita, agricultural wages (middle) and conflict events
(right).
Panel A: Before NREGA
Agricultural Output per Capita Agricultural Wages Conflict Events
-
.
4
-
.
3
-
.
2
-
.
1
0
.
1
.
2
E
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
d
 
C
o
e
f
fi
c
i
e
n
t
 
o
n
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Monsoon Decile
-
.
1
5
-
.
0
5
.
0
5
.
1
5
E
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
d
 
C
o
e
f
fi
c
i
e
n
t
 
o
n
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Monsoon Decile
-
1
-
.
5
0
.
5
1
1
.
5
E
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
d
 
C
o
e
f
fi
c
i
e
n
t
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Monsoon Decile
Panel B: After NREGA
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Notes: Non-parametric regressions including district and region-by-NREGA phase and time effects. The monsoon rainfall measure is broken out into deciles and the regressions are estimated for the two
subsamples, before and after NREGA was introduced. Column (1) and (2) use the contemporaneous monsoon rainfall deciles, while column (3) uses the lagged monsoon rainfall deciles. The estimated
coefficients are plotted with 90% confidence bands obtained from clustering standard errors at the district level indicated as dashed lines.
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Figure A2: Effect of Monsoon Rain on agricultural wages before and after NREGA was introduced in the
IDHS village panel
Panel A: before NREGA Panel B: after NREGA
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Notes: The figure presents results from a regression including village and region by NREGA implementation phase by survey wave fixed effects.
The graph plots out the point estimates of the effect of different quintiles of the monsoon rainfall distribution on agricultural wages. Standard
errors are clustered at the district level with 90% confidence bands indicated.
Figure A3: Robustness to dropping each state in turn
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Notes: The figure presents the distribution of the estimated coefficients obtained when dropping each state in turn as a box plot. The first box
plot presents the estimated coefficients on the log(monsoon rain) measure prior to NREGA introduction, the second presents the coefficient on
the NREGA dummy interacted with the log(monsoon rain) measure, while the third figure presents the distribution of point estimates of the
joint effect.
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Figure A4: Effect of monsoon rain on conflict over time relative to NREGA introduction by NREGA
implementation phase
Panel A: NREGA Phase 1
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Panel B: NREGA Phase 2
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Panel C: NREGA Phase 3
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Notes: The vertical line indicates the NREGA introduction date. The vertical line indicates the NREGA introduction date. Each graph presents
the result of a separate regression on the relevant sub-sample, controlling for district and region by NREGA implementation phase time effects.
The connected red dots are the point estimates of the interaction between lagged monsoon rainfall with the time to NREGA treatment indicator.
The dashed blue lines represent the pooled point estimates for the pre and post NREGA period, 95% confidence bands obtained from clustering
at the district level are indicated as dotted black lines.
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Figure A5: Effect of monsoon rain on conflict over time in the red corridor (panel A) compared to the rest
of India (panel B).
Panel A: Red Corridor Districts
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Panel B: Non-Red Corridor Districts
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
Es
tim
at
ed
 M
on
so
on
-C
on
flic
t E
las
tic
ity
-6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Years to NREGA
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
Es
tim
at
ed
 M
on
so
on
-C
on
flic
t E
las
tic
ity
-6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Years to NREGA
Notes: The vertical line indicates the NREGA introduction date. Each graph presents the result of a separate regression on the relevant sub-
sample, controlling for district and region by NREGA implementation phase time effects. The connected red dots are the point estimates of the
interaction between lagged monsoon rainfall with the time to NREGA treatment indicator. The dashed blue lines represent the pooled point
estimates for the pre and post NREGA period, 95% confidence bands obtained from clustering at the district level are indicated as dotted black
lines.
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Figure A6: Non-parametric regressions of monsoon rainfall deciles on NREGA participation
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Notes: The figure presents results from a regression including district and region by NREGA implementation phase by year time effects. The graph plots out the point estimates of the effect of different
deciles of the monsoon rainfall distribution on NREGA participation. The different NREGA participation measures are indicated in the figure head. Standard errors are clustered at the district level with
90% confidence bands indicated.
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Figure A7: Effect of NREGA monsoon rainfall participation elasticity on conflict levels relative to the
NREGA introduction date
Panel A: 1(φ̂d) estimated off Expenditure/ Capita
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Panel B: 1(φ̂d) estimated off Persondays/ Capita
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Panel C: 1(φ̂d) estimated off Share of Households
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Notes: Effect of NREGA on Conflict Levels: Figures present results from difference in difference estimation of the monsoon rainfall sensitivity
of NREGA participation with regards to conflict levels relative to the introduction period indicated by the red vertical line. The connected red
dots are the point estimates of the interaction between the estimated district specific monsoon induced NREGA participation measure 1(φ̂d) and
the time to NREGA treatment indicator, 95% confidence bands obtained from clustering at the district level are indicated as dotted black lines.
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Table A1: Monsoon rainfall and agricultural wages - village level survey data from the IDHS
log(Agricultural worker wages) log(Skilled construction workers)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log(Monsoont−1) 0.111*** 0.110*** 0.122*** 0.191*** 0.191*** 0.200***
(0.030) (0.028) (0.029) (0.037) (0.035) (0.031)
NREGA × log(Monsoont−1) -0.113*** -0.099*** -0.115*** -0.051 -0.047 -0.060
(0.028) (0.029) (0.032) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038)
Joint Test:
log(Monsoon)+ NREGA x log(Monsoon) = 0 -.002 .011 .008 .14** .144*** .14***
(.0392) (.0388) (.0433) (.0563) (.0548) (.051)
Observations 2617 2564 2275 2728 2679 2430
Clusters 250 250 221 255 255 227
Location FE District Village Village District Village Village
Village controls No No Yes No No Yes
Notes: All regressions include region-phase-time time effects in addition to the location or household fixed effects indicated in the column.
Village controls control for a set of time varying village level measures capturing public good access, such as distance to nearest police station,
infrastructure, whether villages have road access, electricity or have self-help groups. Standard errors clustered at the district level, stars
indicate *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Table A2: Robustness to using the Gawande et al. (2017) alternative conflict data
leveraging local languages
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Overall Civilian Maoist Security forces
log(Monsoont−1) -1.304*** -2.223*** -0.815 -1.343
(0.489) (0.559) (0.672) (0.852)
NREGA x log(Monsoont−1) 2.952*** 4.820*** 1.546 3.182**
(1.019) (1.210) (1.044) (1.586)
Observations 504 465 419 428
Number of Districts 56 52 47 48
Estimation Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson
Notes: All regressions include region-phase-time time effects and a set of district fixed effects.
Standard errors clustered at the district level, stars indicate *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A3: Robustness to Alternative Weather Measures: Moderating Effect of NREGA on Conflict
Events Casualties
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Monsoon deficiencyt−1 1.798*** 1.768***
(0.287) (0.499)
NREGA x Monsoon deficiencyt−1 -1.686*** -1.672***
(0.283) (0.573)
Normalized Monsoont−1 -0.148*** -0.107
(0.050) (0.070)
NREGA x Normalized Monsoont−1 0.142** 0.086
(0.055) (0.074)
Negative Monsoont−1 0.319*** 0.210
(0.101) (0.203)
NREGA x Negative Monsoont−1 -0.489*** -0.639**
(0.137) (0.271)
Positive Monsoont−1 -0.415*** -0.299
(0.139) (0.283)
NREGA x Positive Monsoont−1 0.309** 0.066
(0.148) (0.276)
log(GPCC Raint−1) -1.193*** -1.383***
(0.238) (0.333)
NREGA x log(GPCC Raint−1) 1.488*** 1.582***
(0.291) (0.387)
Drought Severityt−1 6.678*** 7.330***
(1.661) (2.197)
NREGA x Drought Severityt−1 -9.314*** -10.330***
(2.730) (3.807)
Observations 3522 3522 3522 3270 2761 3435 3435 3435 3121 2602
Number of Districts 239 239 239 238 234 239 239 239 233 226
Notes: All regressions include region by NREGA phase and time time effects and district fixed effects. Regressions are estimated using a pseudo maximum likelihood
poisson estimator, on a balanced district level annual panel from 2000-2014. The number of districts reported corresponds to the districts for which the dependent
variable, conditional on the fixed effects, has any variation over the sample period. The weather measures are lagged by one year. Columns (1) and (7) present results
where Monsoon rainfall is normalized by its sample standard deviation. Columns (2) and (8) are placebo’s studying rainfall outside the monsoon growing season.
Columns (3) and (9) use the GPCC rainfall data as alternative rainfall data source, which is available from 2000-2010. Columns (4) and (10) instrument the TRMM
rainfall data with the GPCC data to remove measurement error. Columns (5) and (11) use the Drought Severity index instrumented with monsoon rainfall, which is
available for 2000-2011. Columns (6) and (12) use average temperatures during the growing season. Standard errors are clustered at the district level, stars indicate
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A4: Robustness to controlling for other fixed district characteristic interacted with the NREGA treatment
indicator
Events Casualties
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log(Monsoont−1) -0.729*** -0.727*** -0.632*** -1.016*** -1.011*** -0.654
(0.201) (0.203) (0.198) (0.334) (0.326) (0.431)
NREGA x log(Monsoont−1) 0.720*** 0.714*** 0.742*** 0.916*** 0.905*** 0.577
(0.222) (0.222) (0.219) (0.296) (0.294) (0.405)
Observations 3522 3522 2442 3435 3435 2225
Number of Districts 239 239 229 239 239 214
District Characteristics x NREGA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Star State x NREGA No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Police Force & Deployment proxies x NREGA No No Yes No No Yes
Notes: All regressions include region-phase-time time effects and district fixed effects. The dependent variable throughout is the number
of conflict events. Standard errors are clustered at the district level, with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A5: Alternative Mechanism: Rural Connectivity and Moderation of Rainfall
and Conflict Relationship
Total Events Casualties
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Road Construction
log(Monsoont−1) -0.624*** -1.518*** -0.905*** -1.683***
(0.136) (0.273) (0.341) (0.395)
NREGA x log(Monsoont−1) 1.304*** 1.336***
(0.322) (0.426)
Roads 0.850*** 1.292 0.720 -4.234
(0.308) (3.723) (0.547) (6.544)
Roads x log(Monsoon t− 1) -0.072 0.708
(0.526) (0.923)
Joint Test:
log(Monsoon)+ NREGA x log(Monsoon) = 0 -.213 -.347
(.151) (.343)
Observations 2485 2485 2289 2289
Number of Districts 230 230 217 217
Panel B: Cumulative Road Construction
log(Monsoont−1) -0.581*** -1.550*** -0.900*** -1.912***
(0.133) (0.226) (0.334) (0.406)
NREGA x log(Monsoont−1) 1.443*** 1.694***
(0.255) (0.449)
Cumulative Roads -1.123*** 1.273 -0.815 7.235
(0.434) (2.937) (0.609) (7.549)
Cumulative Roads x log(Monsoon t− 1) -0.356 -1.175
(0.423) (1.051)
Joint Test:
log(Monsoon)+ NREGA x log(Monsoon) = 0 -.107 -.217
(.154) (.335)
Observations 2485 2485 2289 2289
Number of Districts 230 230 217 217
Notes: All regressions include region-phase-time effects and district fixed effects. Regressions are
estimated using a pseudo maximum likelihood poisson estimator, on a balanced district level annual
panel from 2000-2014. Monsoon rain is the previous growing season’s Monsoon rainfall realization.
Panel A studies the effect of contemporaneous road construction on violence, while Panel B studies
the impact of rainfall through the overall share of unconnected villages, that became connected up to
2012. Standard errors are clustered at district level, stars indicate *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A6: Alternative Mechanism: Mining Sector Share, Commodity Boom and
Moderation of Rainfall and Conflict Relationship
Total Events Casualties
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(Monsoont−1) -0.628*** -1.697*** -0.505* -1.516***
(0.128) (0.254) (0.281) (0.414)
NREGA x 1.504*** 1.544***
log(Monsoont−1) (0.326) (0.418)
Mining Sector -37.215** -31.587** -81.684*** -69.701***
(14.906) (12.973) (18.281) (17.240)
Mining Sector x 1.429 0.793 6.423*** 5.343**
log(Monsoon t-1) (1.944) (1.697) (2.312) (2.189)
Joint Test:
log(Monsoon)+ NREGA x log(Monsoon) = 0 -.193 .029
(.145) (.284)
Observations 3259 3259 3180 3180
Number of Districts 221 221 221 221
Notes: All regressions include region-phase-time effects and district fixed effects. Regressions
are estimated using a pseudo maximum likelihood poisson estimator, on a balanced district level
annual panel from 2000-2014. Monsoon rain is the previous growing season’s Monsoon rainfall
realization. Mining Sector Share is the share of the districts domestic product that is generated
in the Mining sector based on data between 1998 and 2005. Standard errors are clustered at the
district level, with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Table A7: Is NREGA demand led? Is rationing correlated with monsoon rain-
fall? Evidence from IDHS 2010/2011 data
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: log(NREGA income)
log(Monsoont−1) -0.140** -0.122** -0.704**
(0.067) (0.060) (0.298)
Observations 8263 8263 8257
Clusters 218 218 212
Panel B: Rationing (Days eligible minus days actually worked)
log(Monsoont−1) 7.870*** 4.117** 16.973
(2.460) (2.063) (10.703)
Observations 9535 9535 9529
Clusters 232 232 226
Panel C: Not enough work available
log(Monsoont−1) 0.091* 0.106** 0.064
(0.047) (0.047) (0.117)
Observations 8233 8233 8225
Clusters 229 229 221
Location FE None State District
Notes: Data is an individual job card specific cross section from the second IDHS survey wave.
All regressions include region-phase time effects and a set of district fixed effects. The dependent
variable in Panel C is a dummy indicating whether individuals state that there is not sufficient
work available. This is estimated on the subset of individuals who report that they have been
awarded fewer days of work then they are eligible. Standard errors clustered at the district level,
stars indicate *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A8: In which districts is demand for NREGA work correlated with monsoon rainfall?
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Household Size -0.106***
(0.018)
Illiterate [share] 0.154*** 0.126*** 0.105*** 0.087*** 0.090*** 0.089*** 0.083*** 0.087*** 0.167*** 0.170*** 0.163***
(0.026) (0.028) (0.029) (0.027) (0.027) (0.031) (0.030) (0.029) (0.041) (0.042) (0.041)
Population younger than 6 [share] -0.180*** -0.191*** -0.172*** -0.192*** -0.197*** -0.166*** -0.177*** -0.182*** -0.266*** -0.268*** -0.227***
(0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.035) (0.033) (0.033) (0.046) (0.047) (0.049)
Gender Gap [per 1000 people] 0.063*** 0.066*** 0.106*** 0.112*** 0.079*** 0.107*** 0.115*** 0.109*** 0.108*** 0.107***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.025) (0.026) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
Inside Red Corridor 0.121*** 0.135*** 0.135*** 0.134*** 0.136*** 0.139*** 0.153*** 0.157*** 0.140***
(0.037) (0.036) (0.036) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051)
Tribal Population [share] 0.084*** 0.086*** 0.073*** 0.075*** 0.086* 0.081* 0.078*
(0.018) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.045) (0.045) (0.043)
Elevation -0.020 -0.024 -0.048** -0.048** -0.051**
(0.015) (0.015) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Primary School [share] -0.064** -0.079*** -0.073*** -0.083** -0.080** -0.081**
(0.026) (0.025) (0.026) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038)
Primary Health Care Centre [share] 0.063** 0.081*** 0.080*** 0.080** 0.075** 0.075**
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
Monsoon elasticity of agricultural output 0.048*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.071** 0.070** 0.064**
(0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.030) (0.028) (0.029)
Monsoon elasticity of agricultural wages 0.041** 0.044*** 0.043***
(0.016) (0.015) (0.015)
Phase 2 -0.097* -0.095*
(0.052) (0.052)
Population growth 1991-2001 -0.072**
(0.029)
Best Subset X
Mean of DV .199 .199 .199 .199 .199 .199 .191 .191 .191 .225 .225 .225
Observations 543 543 543 543 543 543 471 471 471 284 284 284
R2 .0707 .0869 .104 .124 .16 .163 .186 .21 .213 .302 .311 .322
Notes: Table reports results from OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the 1(φ̂d) dummy as described in Section 5, where the φ̂d are estimated using the NREGA participation data measuring the number
of days worked per capita. Empirical models selected using best subset selection on the set of predictors using the AIC information criterion. The full set of variables among which best-subset selection choses
includes 31 covariates. The best subset marked by “X”. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses, asterisks indicate *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A9: Difference in Difference: NREGA Effect on conflict levels due to insurance using alternative 1(φ̂d) definition.
Conflict Events Casualties
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: φ̂d in the lower 10%
NREGA x 1(φ̂d) -0.872** -1.016** -0.151 -0.821 -1.185** -0.039
(0.423) (0.473) (0.465) (0.547) (0.600) (0.390)
Panel B: φ̂d in the lower 20%
NREGA x 1(φ̂d) -0.925** -0.629 -0.647** -0.988** -0.824* -0.641
(0.363) (0.399) (0.325) (0.481) (0.476) (0.398)
Panel C: φ̂d in the lower 30%
NREGA x 1(φ̂d) -0.627* -0.469 -0.450* -0.926** -0.761** -0.531
(0.334) (0.304) (0.261) (0.420) (0.377) (0.357)
1(φ̂d) estimated off NREGA data for Expenditure Person days Households Expenditure Person days Households
Notes: Table presents results from a difference-in-difference exercise, comparing conflict levels in districts, across places where demand for NREGA is
responsive to monsoon rainfall, before and after NREGA was introduced. 1(φ̂d) is a dummy variable that is coded as 1 in case the estimate φ̂d is in
the lower 20% of the empirical distribution of estimates of φd indicating that demand for NREGA is decreasing in monsoon rainfall in a district. All
regressions include region-phase-time time effects and a set of district fixed effects, which ensures that the difference-in-difference is not identified off
variation across NREGA implementation phases. Regressions are estimated using a pseudo maximum likelihood poisson estimator, on a balanced district
level annual panel from 2000- 2014. The φ̂d is estimated using data on total expenditure per capita (columns (1) and (3)), the number of days worked per
capita (columns (2) and (5)) and the share of households that demand NREGA work in a district and financial year (column (3) and (6)). Panel A presents
the baseline results. Panel B explores heterogeneity by NREGA implementation phase, while Panel C explores the effect within the Red Corridor. Standard
errors clustered at the district level, stars indicate *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A10: Difference in Difference: NREGA effect on conflict levels due to insurance using continuous φd measure
Conflict Events Casualties
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Overall Effect
NREGA x φ̂d -0.602 -0.086** -0.827** -0.945 -0.133** -1.083
(0.369) (0.043) (0.399) (0.617) (0.066) (0.667)
Panel B: By NREGA Phase
NREGA x Phase 1 x φ̂d -1.459*** -0.113* -1.272** -1.439* -0.145* -1.205
(0.519) (0.058) (0.631) (0.791) (0.077) (0.860)
NREGA x Phase 2 x φ̂d 0.248 -0.041* -0.531 0.111 -0.063* -0.358
(0.204) (0.025) (0.759) (0.221) (0.032) (0.989)
NREGA x Phase 3 x φ̂d -0.010 -0.017 0.057 -0.146 -0.081 -0.702
(0.032) (0.016) (0.162) (0.220) (0.086) (0.536)
Panel C: In the Red Corridor
Inside Red Corridor x NREGA x φ̂d -1.411*** -0.114** -1.429** -1.631** -0.174** -1.424
(0.501) (0.055) (0.711) (0.826) (0.084) (1.041)
Outside Red Corridor x NREGA x φ̂d 0.046 -0.011 0.001 -0.015 -0.018 -0.369
(0.038) (0.010) (0.148) (0.075) (0.023) (0.334)
Mean of DV 3.31 2.97 3.35 5.14 4.74 5.06
Observations 3492 3492 3492 3405 3405 3405
Number of Districts 237 237 237 237 237 237
1(φ̂d) estimated off NREGA data for Expenditure Person days Households Expenditure Person days Households
Notes: Table presents results from a difference-in-difference exercise, comparing conflict levels in districts, across places where demand for NREGA is
responsive to monsoon rainfall, before and after NREGA was introduced. φ̂d measures whether demand for NREGA is decreasing in monsoon rainfall.
Regressions are weighted by the inverse of the standard error of the estimated φ̂d. All regressions include region-phase-time time effects and a set of district
fixed effects. Regressions are estimated using a pseudo maximum likelihood poisson estimator, on a balanced district level annual panel from 2000- 2014.
The φ̂d is estimated using data on total expenditure per capita (columns (1) and (3)), the number of days worked per capita (columns (2) and (5)) and the
share of households that demand NREGA work in a district and financial year (column (3) and (6)). Panel A presents the baseline results. Panel B explores
heterogeneity by NREGA implementation phase, while Panel C explores the effect within the Red Corridor. Standard errors clustered at the district level,
stars indicate *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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A.1 Ruling Out Other Mechanisms
This section rules out a range of alternative explanations or policies that could ex-
plain why the Monsoon rainfall and conflict relationship has become weaker. Most
notably is the Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana Rural Road Construction Scheme
(PMGSY) that was implemented around the same time as NREGA was devised and
introduced. Other confounders are the Integrated Action Plan, which channels addi-
tional funds into left-wing extremist affected districts. I also address a concern that
large mineral sectors are driving the observed moderation.
A.1.1 Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana Rural Road Construction Scheme
A concern with the analysis is that the Indian government has put forth many other
development programs, whose implementation may affect the relationship between
Monsoon and conflict at the same time and may be correlated with the roll-out of
NREGA. In this case, the results would falsely attribute the observed inward rotation
of the Monsoon-rainfall andconflict relationship to the employment guarantee scheme.
The most prominent developmental scheme that was implemented around the same
time is the Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana (PMGSY). This scheme was introduced
in 2000 and aims to provide improved road access for rural households. The scheme in
particular aimed to provide roads to all villages with at least 1000 inhabitants by 2003,
with a population of 500 and more by 2007 and had special provisions for tiny villages
with at least 250 inhabitants for the hill states, tribal areas and desert areas. These
were to be connected by 2007. As early NREGA districts are among the poorest and
least urbanised, they are more likely to have received treatment through the PMGSY
as well, which could partly explain my reduced form findings.
The crucial role that transport infrastructure may have in mitigating adverse weather
shocks has been highlighted in Burgess and Donaldson (2010). Aggarwal (2014) evalu-
ates the impact of the PMGSY using a difference-in-difference design and finds that the
1
scheme increased incomes by increasing the potential market size for locally produced
agricultural commodities; in addition, there is less price dispersion across market cen-
ters. I use her data to see whether the PMGSY moderates the relationship between
Monsoon rainfall and conflict. I construct two variables: first, the share of all un-
connected habitats connected in a year and second, the cumulative share of habitats
among the unconnected habitats that received road access by the end of each year. The
former measure may pick up direct effects from road construction on violence, while
the latter variable, in its interaction with rainfall, could pick up the more persistent
effects of this scheme by connecting previously unconnected villages.
The empirical design is identical to the main analysis, except that I now add these
controls and interaction terms to the main specification. The results are presented
in Table A5. Column (1) and (2) study violence intensity, while column (3) and (4)
look at incidence. Panel A presents the results for contemporary road construction,
while Panel B looks at cumulative connectivity. Columns (1) and (3) look at the rural
connectivity and its interaction with rainfall by itself, while column (3) and (4) are a
type of horse race. In neither specifications do the road construction interactions with
rainfall achieve predictive power. This renders me confident that my results genuinely
reflect the effect of the workfare scheme on the dynamics of conflict.
A.1.2 Mineral resources
Another concern is that the NREGA interactions may be picking up moderation
of rainfall shocks due to a sectoral shift away from agriculture to the mining sector,
which is less affected by rainfall variation. Vanden Eynde (2016) shows that districts
with a large mining sector see a smaller elasticity between rainfall and conflict. If the
introduction of NREGA is correlated with a sectoral shift towards the mineral resource
sector, the NREGA interactions could be picking up this effect. This is not entirely
implausible as the mid 2000s saw a commodity price boom which could have induced
a lot more investment in the mining sector. In order to control for this I construct a
share of a district’s income that is due to the mining sector.1
Again, the specifications I present are very similar, adding a simple interaction
with the mining sector share in district domestic product interacted with the Monsoon
season rainfall. The results are presented in Table A6. Column (1) presents the re-
sults on violence intensity without the NREGA interactions. It becomes evident that
1I use district domestic product data for years between 1998 to 2005 available from
http://planningcommission.nic.in/plans/stateplan/index.php?state=ssphdbody.htm, accessed on
21.06.2014. The district domestic product construction is discussed in detail in Katyal et al. (2001).
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districts with a larger share of the mining sector experience a weaker relationship
between violence and Monsoon rain. This maps into the findings of Vanden Eynde
(2016). Once including the NREGA interaction, the coefficient on the Mining sector
interaction becomes insignificant. More importantly, the NREGA interaction remains
strongly significant. This suggests that the NREGA effect seems not to be picking up
a moderation in the Monsoon shock and conflict relationship due to the presence of a
large mineral resource sector.
A.1.3 Integrated Action Plan
A second important policy aimed to tackle the maoist conflict is the Integrated
Action Plan (henceforth, IAP). The plan was presented in 2010 and provides special
funding for for districts that are considered to be severely affected by left-wing extrem-
ism. Originally it was designed for 33 districts, but since then, it expanded to provide
additional funding for 82 districts. The money is to be spend on projects such as roads
and other public infrastructure to improve rural livelihoods; some projects are specif-
ically aimed to improving the way NREGA is made accessible in these districts: some
IAP funding may be used to complement NREGA projects. Another margin through
which the IAP may have a distinct level effect on conflict is provided as money may be
used to reinforce police stations to expand the states’ presence in rural areas.
Investment in infrastructure funded by the IAP could moderate the rainfall depen-
dence of income and thus, on conflict. I don’t think that the IAP would have the effects
described in this paper, as its implementation would have to correlate meaningfully
with lagged Monsoon rainfall. Since the grants are block grants, this is unlikely to
be the case. Nevertheless I study this and the results are presented in Table 6. In
any case, there are three simple things I can do to rule out effects of the IAP driving
my results. Firstly, I can drop the 33 districts which received the scheme from 2010
onwards.2 The results from this is presented in columns (2) and (5). The interaction
term becomes smaller and size and statistical significance, especially for the conflict
intensity regressions. This is not implausible as the districts that receive the IAP are
ones with most variation in conflict. In second exercise, I can restrict the analysis to
the period from 2000 - 2010. Again, the estimated coefficient on the post NREGA
period become weaker, but the core result is still there. In the last exercise I study
2The districts translate into 30 districts according to the 2001 Indian census district definitions, they
are: Aurangabad (Bihar), Arwal, Balaghat, Bastar, Bokaro, Chatra, Dantewada, Deogarh, Gadchiroli, Ga-
japati, Gaya, Garhwa, Gondiya, Gumla, Hazaribagh, Jamui, Jehanabad, Khammam, Lohardaga, Midna-
pore, Nabarangpur, Palamu, Pashchim singhbhum, Purba singhbhum, Rajnandgaon, Rayagada, Rohtas,
Sambalpur, Sonbhadra, Surguja, Malkangiri.
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IAP fund expenditures, which measures utilisation of the disbursal amounts. Column
(1) indicates that IAP expenditures are not correlated with lagged Monsoon rainfall.
Column (3) and (6) study the effect of IAP expenditures on conflict. There appears to
be a positive relationship between the two. The estimated coefficient on the NREGA
interaction remains the same, thus rendering the core result robust.
A.1.4 Operation Green Hunt
A major military operation to tackle maoist violence has been underway since late
November 2009. The operation involves the deployment of Central Armed Reserve
Police force to aide state governments tackle maoist threat. If deployment of troops
is correlated with lagged Monsoon season rainfall, this could explain some of the ob-
served patterns. It is not clear in which direction the effect should be. If military
deployment was correlated with lagged rainfall, increased military deployment fol-
lowing an adverse shock could either lead to a conflict escalation or a reduction in
conflict. Unfortunately, data on military deployment is not available. As with the in-
tegrated action plan, I can limit the analysis to the period before 2010 or by removing
a set of districts that likely, were the primary target for a military operation. As these
districts are most likely to coincide with districts receiving IAP spending, the results
from the previous section alleviate this concern to some extent.
B Data Appendix
B.1 Conflict data
Empirical research on the economics of conflict almost always suffer from severe
data limitations. This lies in the nature of the subject of study, that typically places that
exhibit conflict are only weakly institutionalised with little official report of violence
and little press and media coverage. Blattman and Miguel (2010)’s review cites that the
correlation across different civil war datasets ranges from 0.42 to 0.96, which may be
the reason why empirical results are often not reproducible using similar identification
strategies, but different datasets or variable definitions (e.g. Ciccone (2011)).
There exists no broad conflict dataset that covers India or South East Asia as
a whole. This paper documents the process through which in the Indian context
41,347 newspaper reports were transformed into a workable conflict dataset using
both machine-learning, semi-automated coding techniques and scalable manual hand-
coding methods. The SATP text database represents the most extensive and systematic
collection of sources covering conflict in India. It covers an extensive collection of
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more than 61 distinct English language sources. This vastly improves over the limited
set of press agency sources that traditional databases on insurgency violence, such as
the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), exploit. Appendix table B1 lists the 61 most
frequently mentioned sources; there is a multitude of research papers that have sepa-
rately hand coded subsets of the primary SATP newspaper clippings, covering various
Indian states or various time-periods, see Table B2 for a non-exhaustive tabulation.
This results in a coverage of almost ten times as many conflict events.
B.2 Raw sources in the SATP corpus
Table B1: Tabulation of most frequently cited newspaper sources
Rank News Source Frequency
1 The Hindu 3862
2 The Times of India 3046
3 Daily Excelsior 3016
4 Times Of India 2663
5 The Shillong Times 2153
6 Nagaland Post 1847
7 Assam Tribune 1752
8 The Telegraph on 1751
9 The Sangai Express 1380
10 PTI 1224
11 Sentinel 1138
12 Imphal Free Press 1131
13 Sangai Express 1092
14 The Sentinel 1071
15 Kangla Online 818
16 Indian Express 728
17 Hindustan Times 706
18 ZEE News 659
19 IANS 650
20 IBN Live 484
21 New Indian Express 453
22 The Business Standard 346
23 The Pioneer 331
24 TripuraInfo 299
25 Kashmir Times 242
26 The Economic Times 215
27 Deccan Chronicle 177
28 ANI 162
29 Sify com 156
30 NDTV 133
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This section sketches the semi-automated process through which the daily news-
paper clippings are transformed. A typical sample may look as follows:
Two unidentified terrorists massacred six members of a family and left a
seventh injured at Mangnar Top, Poonch district, on December 31, 2001.
Local residents refused to cremate the bodies of the slain victims, insisting
that a Union Minister should visit the area and take notice of the increasing
terrorist violence there.
The semi-automated routine defines a conflict event as a tuple, E = {L, T, V, S, O}
defined by a location L, a date or time of the event T, a verb V that indicates the type of
violent act, and the verb’s associated subject S, the perpetrator of the act and the object
O that was subjected to the act V. The semi-automated routine tries to fill all these
elements of the tuple for each sentence using common machine-learning algorithms
implemented in natural language processing packages.
I work with the following set of Trained Natural Language Processing Algorithms:
1. Sentence Detection to break up individual sentences.
2. Semantic Role Labelling (SRL) to tag the grammatical structure of words in rela-
tion to one another.
3. Named Entity Recognition (NER) to identify names (places, institutions, names)
lives off spelling, preposition and gazetteer. Complemented with dictionary of
1,978 spelling variations.
4. Part of Speech Tagging (POS) to tag role of words (subject, verb, object)
These are together implemented in SENNA (Collobert et al., 2011), available as
open-source in C. The sample output for the above sentence would look like:
The refinements include a set of processing steps and can be thought of as a form
of supervised machine learning. In the first step, I refine the set of verbs that are
indicative of a conflict event. This approach is naturally much more powerful: most
hand coding routines remove text in which the word ”to kill” does not appear. The set
of verbs included is: abduct, ambush, arrest, assassin, assault, attack, attempt, beat up,
beaten, beaten up, blast, blew up, blow up, blowing up, blown up, bomb, bombard,
boycott, brand, burn, burnt, burnt down, bust, carried out, claim, clash, comb, damag,
defus, demolish, desert, detain, deton, encount, ensu, erupt, escap, execut, explod,
extort, fight, fire, fled, flee, gunned down, hijack, hit, hurl, hurt, imprison, improvis,
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Two B-A0 B-A0
unidentified I-A0 I-A0
terrorists E-A0 E-A0
massacred massacred S-V
six B-A1
members I-A1
of I-A1
a I-A1
family E-A1
and
left left S-V
a B-A1 B-A1
seventh I-A1 E-A1
injured injured I-A1 S-V
at I-A1 B-AM-LOC
Mangnar B-LOC I-A1 I-AM-LOC
Top E-LOC I-A1 I-AM-LOC
, I-A1 I-AM-LOC
Poonch S-LOC I-A1 I-AM-LOC
district I-A1 E-AM-LOC
, I-A1
on I-A1
December I-A1
31 I-A1
, I-A1
2001 E-A1
infiltr, injur, intimid, kidnap, kill, laid, laid down, launch, lob, loot, lynch, massacr,
murder, neutral, neutralis, propag, protest, raid, rape, recov, retali, rob, seiz, set, set
ablaz, shell, shot, shot down, shut down, slit, smash, stab, storm, strike, struck, struggl,
succumb, suffer, surrend, sustain, threaten, tipped off, torch, tortur, trap, trigger, went
off, wound.
This approach maps to the event coding ontology used for global data bases such
as the Global Database of Events, Language, and Tone (GDELT).
The second refinement involves exploring the extracted location elements, in order
to define a common spatial resolution. In the case of the SATP data for India, the
common resolution is the district level. For a significant share of events, finer spa-
tial resolution to the police station level are possible. The population of mentioned
locations are mapped and matched against a gazetteer of district names and spelling
variations to achieve the geographic resolution at the 2001 census district level.
B.3 Definition of event candidates
A sentence is considered a candidate for an event as long as an object, a verb
and a location can be deduced. Information on the date of an event is contained in
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the meta-information for the newspaper record (the date that it was published). The
set of candidates to the set of sentences, for which the location information can be
matched to district names and the set of verbs is in the selected subset. In the above
text-snippet, only one sentence satisfies the requirement of elements forming an event
tuple E = {L, T, V, S, O} being present. This yields:
E1 = {′Mangar Top Poonch′,′December 31 2001′,
′massacre′,′ two unidentified terrorists′,
′six members of a family at Mangnar Top, Poonch district′}
This is essentially mimicking the process through which humans would code this
data manually. Each sentence is constrained to contain only information for at most
one event. The individual elements of the tuple E are then transformed by assigning
labels to the snippets indicating whether the actor was a terrorist, security force or a
civilian and similarly for who subjected to the act V.
In the last step, actors are labeled and conflict casualties are counted. This is done,
collecting human judgements from a crowd-sourcing platform and squaring these hu-
man judgements with a trained support vector machine learning algorithm. The focus
is particularly on the object of a verb. In the above case, we want to label the perpetra-
tor (“two unidentified terrorists”) of the act of “massacring” to be “terrorists” and the
object of the verb massacre (“six members of a family”) to be “civilians.”3
The dataset has been validated in two ways. First, I cross-validate the resulting
data, comparing the machine coding with human coding for a subset of data. The next
two sections explain this cross-validation.
3Appendix B.1 provides an example with detailed algorithm output.
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Table B2: A non-exhaustive tabulation of other papers using or referring to the SATP raw data.
Paper Time Coverage Spatial Coverage Resolution Primary data source Method
Shrivastava (2014) 2006-2011 Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chattisgarh, District SATP Panel regression
Jharkhand, Orissa and West Bengal
Gawande et al. (2017) 2004-2009 Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chattisgarh, Districts, 2001 local language newspapers Panel IV regression
and Jharkhand
Gomes (2012) 1979-2009 16 main states District Union across Cross-sectional regression
GTD, WITS, SATP
Hoelscher et al. (2012) 2004-2010 Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chattisgarh, District Intersection across Cross-sectional regression
Jharkhand, Orissa and West Bengal GTD, WITS, SATP
Khanna and Zimmermann (2017) 2005-2007 Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chattisgarh, District, 2001 SATP state time-lines RDD
Jharkhand, Orissa and West Bengal
Morgan and Reiter (2013) 2001-2011 whole country District, 2003 GDELT / SATP Panel regression
Vanden Eynde (2016) 2004-2010 Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgharh, combined districts SATP state time-lines Panel reduced form regression
Jharkhand, Karnataka, Maharashtra, using 2001 basis
Orissa and West Bengal
Buhaug and Wischnath (2014) 1980-2011 whole country State ISPS, SATP, Uppsala Panel regression
9
B.4 Comparison with human coding
In order to assess the accuracy of the machine generated conflict dataset, the data
for the year 2005, roughly the middle of the sample period, has been hand coded at
the sentence level. The human coding can improve along three margins:
1. detect multiple events defined in a sentence
2. assign and infer locations, e.g. provided by names of towns that are not part of a
district name.
3. reduce concerns of double counting.
The machine will not be able to detect if multiple events across different districts
are mentioned in a single sentence. Here, the machine would, at most, identify a
single event for one of the districts mentioned. Similarly, in few instances, the location
information is not provided at the district level, but, for example, at the level of town
names. In this case, unless the name of the town is part of the district name, the
automatic matching to district names, would fail, leaving the location field empty.
Lastly, there are concerns about double counting for conflict events that are repeatedly
reported on. An example is a terrorist attack which is reported in one week, and a
later news report, that adds further information.
Despite these three potential concerns, the machine coding performs extremely
well. I assess the fit of the datasets, by simply computing conditional or unconditional
correlation coefficients of the number of conflict events at the district level for the
whole year (2005), per quarter and at the monthly level.
Table B3: Conditional and Unconditional Correlations
Between Human- and Machine Coding
Time Resolution
Year Quarter Month
Unconditional Correlation Coefficient 0.987 0.964 0.932
Conditional Correlation Coefficient NA 0.881 0.826
Human coding does not consistently outperform machine coding. The uncondi-
tional correlation coefficients are above 0.95, while the conditional correlation, after
removing location and time effects, is consistently above 0.8 (see Table B3).
Visually, the differences are plotted in Figure B1, which presents the conditional
correlation, after removing district and month fixed effects, between human and ma-
chine coding. The 45◦ degree line which would correspond to an exact fit. Human
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coding outperforms machine coding, in cases where information needs to be inferred
from the context, which especially applies to coding of location information. However,
the overall fit is very good.
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Figure B1: Comparison of Human Coding to Machine Coding for 2005 of conflict event
count data at the district level and by monthly resolution. The blue line indicates the
linear regression fit, while the black line indicates the 45 degree line.
B.5 Comparison of results with Global Terrorism Database
This section highlights that the results obtained in my paper can not be replicated
when studying the conflict for India contained in the Global Terrorism Database (GTD)
collected by National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terror-
ism at the University of Maryland. This database has been used in more than 30 journal
publications and thus, serves as an interesting testing ground. Unfortunately, the GTD
database does not come at a district level spatial resolution. However, it provides the
nearest big town to where the incident occurred. In order to be able to compare the
datasets, I geo-code the locations of the nearest towns to obtain a similar district level
count variable of the number of conflict events. I then estimate the main specifications
using the number of terrorist incidences in the global terrorism database as a left-hand
side. The results are presented in Table B4.
Columns (1)-(3) study the dataset used in this paper, while columns (4)-(6) use the
GTD database. In column (4) it becomes obvious that in the GTD data, there appears
to be no statistically significant correlation between rainfall and conflict, while there is
a strong documented in the dataset used in this paper, indicated in column (1). The
geographic coverage of the GTD dataset is a lot more limited before the introduction
of NREGA, with only 57 districts reported as having violent incidences before NREGA
was introduced while there are almost three times as many districts reported in the
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Table B4: NREGA Effect in the GTD and this dataset
This Dataset Global Terrorism Database
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pre NREGA Dynamic Level Pre NREGA Dynamic Levels
Monsoon -0.866*** -1.330*** -0.680*** -0.985 -1.338* -1.062**
(0.270) (0.306) (0.261) (0.684) (0.764) (0.462)
NREGA x Monsoon 1.098*** 0.359
(0.388) (0.676)
NREGA -0.540*** -1.098
(0.166) (1.264)
Observations 2841 8868 10199 851 5268 5268
Number of Districts 148 217 217 57 186 186
Notes: All regressions are estimated using a pseduo-maximum likelihood estimator, whose moment
conditions coincide with a Poisson model. Regressions in columns (1)-(2) and (4)-(5) include region-
phase-time effects as well as district fixed effects, while results for columns (3) and (6) come from a
regression with time- and district fixed effects. The dependent variable is the number of incidences per
district and quarter. Robust standard errors clustered at the district level are given in the parentheses
with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
other datasets. The moderating effect of NREGA is seen only in column (2), but not in
column (5), albeit the coefficient is positive.
As the number of districts covered in the GTD database seems to increase signifi-
cantly when expanding the analysis to the whole time-period in column (5) it becomes
instructive to study how the correlation between these two datasets has evolved over
time. I regress the two datasets onto one another, allowing for there to be a separate
coefficient for each year:
GTDdt = δd + brt +
2010
∑
t=2000
γt Adt + edt
The estimated coefficients γt are plotted out in Figure B2.
The specification, by using district- and region by time effects takes out any fixed-
conflict region and time varying reporting differences, while the district fixed effects
remove any time-invariant district specific reporting biases. The coefficients paint a
very stark picture: the datasets do not compare well at all before 2007. The good news
is that the coefficients are consistently positive, suggesting that the overall correlation is
positive. However, the point estimates are very small and only sometimes statistically
significantly different from zero. This suggests that int he earlier years it is extremely
unlikely for an incident captured in one dataset to appear in the other. In more recent
years, the data become increasingly similar.
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Figure B2: Relationship between this data and GTD Data over Time
Why have the two datasets converged? It appears that the underlying data source
in the GTD database has evolved significantly over time. Since 2008, the SATP reports
feed into the GTD database, while before that the GTD database was mainly fed by
newswire services. By 2010, more than 53% of the incidences in the GTD database were
directly referenced with a report from the SATP newspaper clippings dataset. This is
clearly, a lower bound since for many reports in the GTD dataset one can manually
find references in the SATP dataset, but not necessarily vice versa.
While the level of violence reported in the GTD database seems to be significantly
lower for early years, it is important for the identification whether this mismatch in
reporting is correlated with rainfall realizations.
In order to explore this, I measure the differences and the absolute value of the
differences between the two datasets and run the three specifications from above again.
The results are presented in table B5. The coefficients suggest that a positive rainfall
realisation in the preceding month is significantly correlated with a lower reporting
difference, i.e. implying that the mismatch between the data used in this paper and
the GTD dataset is smaller. This highlights that reporting is likely to be endogenous
to past weather and thus, past income realizations. While this is something that can
fundamentally, not be checked, I believe that this is more likely to be a problem for
the GTD database. The introduction of NREGA appears to have further reduced the
mismatch between the two datasets.
If we take this and the previous results together, this suggests that there is some
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Table B5: Evolution of Reporting Differences between GTD and this datasets
Reporting Difference Absolute Value of Reporting Difference
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pre NREGA Dynamic Level Pre NREGA Dynamic Levels
Monsoon -0.078** -0.090** -0.107*** -0.136***
(0.032) (0.036) (0.030) (0.034)
NREGA x Monsoon 0.051 0.060
(0.042) (0.043)
NREGA -0.398 -0.048 -0.503* -0.094*
(0.269) (0.055) (0.278) (0.050)
Observations 12657 25521 27693 12657 25521 27693
Number of Districts 543 543 543 543 543 543
Notes: All regressions are simple linear regressions with time- and district fixed effects. Robust standard
errors clustered at the district level are given in the parentheses with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05,
* p < 0.1.
systematic differences to the GTD dataset which correlates with rainfall in a systematic
way and the introduction of NREGA may have lead to a moderation of this reporting
difference. Since the two datasets appear to be converging over time and the coverage
of the GTD dataset actually expanding, it seems reasonable to conclude that the SATP
data source on which my dataset is a more consistent way to measure conflict.
B.6 Agricultural output, harvest prices and District Domestic Product
I construct a measure of district level agricultural output. This is coming from crop
production statistics collected at the district level, by the Directorate of Economics and
Statistics in the Ministry of Agriculture.4 Its the highest quality district level crop
production database that exists for India at the district level. District offices collect
the data and then forward the data to the Directorate of Economics and Statistics.
Typically, there are reporting lags of one or two years. The data is of high quality, but
does not reflect total agricultural production. Production from small scale farms or
home production is not included.
For every district, I compute a measure of agricultural output value. I only con-
sider crops that have been consistently planted on at least 1000 acres for the whole
period that the state reports agricultural production. This leaves the following crops:
bajra, barley, castor-seed, chilly, cotton, gram, groundnut, jowar, jute, linseed, maize,
mesta, potato, ragi, rapeseed, rice, sesamum, sugarcane, tobacco, tumeric, tur-arhar
and wheat. These capture India’s most important staple crops as well as cash crops.
Underrepresented is production of fruits or other horticulture products.
4This data is available on http://apy.dacnet.nic.in/cps.aspx, accessed 14.12.2013.
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For each of these crops, I obtained state-level farm harvest prices to compute a
district level measure of the agricultural output value. Unfortunately, district level
harvest prices were not available throughout or only for a limited number of crops
that did not match well with the actual planted crops. For that reason, I stuck with
the state-level prices. The resulting dataset is an unbalanced panel going from 1999 to
2011.
Total output produced is significantly lower than total district level agricultural
sector output value. For the quantification exercise on the insurance value, I scale up
the district level agricultural output value to match the district domestic product for
the year 2000. The district domestic product is an estimate of local area incomes that
has been produced for the period 1998-2005, but is not available for more recent years.5
It relies on a large set of input statistics, including the Annual Survey of Industry, the
National Sample Survey and Crop Production Surveys. The district domestic product
construction is discussed in detail in Katyal et al. (2001). I obtain a baseline measure
of the agricultural output per capita from the district domestic product. This measure
will be unambiguously larger than the computed agricultural output value derived
from the crop production statistics, as I only include crops that have been consistently
reported for the time period that a state reports data to the Directorate of Economics
and Statistics. I compute for each district a scaling factor ωd that measures the share
of the agricultural output value per capita that is captured in the agricultural district
domestic product. I then simply scale up the agricultural output value per capita by
this scaling factor. This preserves the variation but likely gets the agricultural output
value closer to the true. This scaled agricultural output value per capita will be used
for the quantification exercise to evaluate how much insurance NREGA provides.
B.7 Agricultural Wages in India
I use wage data from the annual publication Agricultural Wages in India, which
has been published from 1958 up to 2010. This data provides up to monthly frequency,
village level wage data across Indian districts. This is the raw data that has been used
to construct the World Bank Agriculture and Climate dataset on India that has been
very widely used, most recently, by Kaur (2018). For the period 2005-2010, versions of
the data can be obtained in electronic form6. Data for previous years does not exist in
digital form, but needs to be obtained as hard copies from India and then digitized. I
5The data is available from http://planningcommission.nic.in/plans/stateplan/index.php?
state=ssphdbody.htm, accessed on 21.06.2014.
6This is available from http://eands.dacnet.nic.in/AWIS.htm, accessed 12.10.2012.
15
obtained hard copies of the reports and digitized the data from 1998 onwards.
The raw data gives monthly wages for male, female and children, broken into
skilled- and unskilled agricultural labour and different types of labour. The types of
skilled labour are blacksmith, carpenter and cobbler, while unskilled labour combines
ploughman, reaper/harvester, sower, weeder, other agricultural labour. In some states,
these separate unskilled labour categories are not reported7, but rather, a category
“Field Labour Wages” is reported. I focus on the male wage series for the occupations
”ploughman” or ”field laborer”
In some districts these wages are reported throughout the year, while in others the
wages are reported only in the parts of the year, when particular activities are actually
carried out (i.e. sowing wages in the early monsoon season of May, June and July),
while harvesting wages are reported in the fall of a given year.
After digitizing and entering the raw data, I proceed to construct an annual level
agricultural field-labour wage as my main dependent variable as simple average. This
results in an unbalanced district level panel stretching from 1998 to 2010.
B.8 TRMM rainfall data
This paper is the first one in economics to use data from the Tropical Rainfall Mea-
suring Mission (TRMM) satellite, which was jointly operated by the National Aero-
nautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Japan Aerospace and Exploration
Agency (JAXA). The satellite carried a set of five instruments to construct gridded rain-
fall rates at very high spatial and temporal resolution. It recorded data from 1998 to
2014, when the satellite started to de-orbit. The dataset is considered to be the highest
quality remote sensed rainfall dataset, with global coverage, currently available (see Li
et al., 2012).
The TRMM Multi-Satellite Precipitation Analysis provides daily rainfall from 1998
to 2014 at a fine spatial resolution of 0.25 by 0.25 degree grid-cell size. The data from
the various instruments aboard the satellite are cleaned and calibrated using additional
data from the accumulated Climate Assessment and Monitoring System (CAMS). The
output of the algorithm are 3-hourly rainfall rates for that time-period. This is then
scaled up to obtain monthly mean precipitation rates, which in turn are transformed
into overall monthly rainfall.
Remotely sensed weather data is an important source of data, in particular, for less
developed countries, where observational data is scarce. This is particularly relevant
7The states for which this is the case are Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Maharashtra.
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in the case of India, where observational weather may vary in systematic ways. There
are three main drawbacks. First, most observations come from rain gauges, where
measurements are taken once a day. Climatologist are concerned about rain gauges in
particular in tropical- or subtropical areas, since most rainfall is convective. Such con-
vective rainfalls are highly local, generating intermittent and scattered rainfall, which
may not be picked up using rain gauges, if the network is not spatially fine enough.
The TRMM satellite orbits the earth every 90 minutes, thus providing multiple obser-
vations each day. An alternative is to consider data from weather radars. Rainfall radar
may provide estimates for rainfall in a radius of 200 km around the station, however it
is unreliable for distances in excess of 200 km. In the Indian case, rainfall radar data is
not made available and would be problematic, since most reporting radar stations are
clustered along the coast. The third general concern regarding observational weather
data is the fact that reporting may be endogenous e.g. to violence or other variables
that are correlated with the dynamics of violence. This has been highlighted recently
by Smith et al. (2011), who show that Somalian piracy has generated a ”black hole”
in the Indian ocean, where observational weather data from merchant vessels is not
available anymore, as vessels take routes avoiding piracy infested areas.8
I prefer the TRMM data as it is less subject to systematic measurement error, as the
underlying data source is consistent over time. This is not the case with rain gauge
based data, such as the GPCC as used by Miguel et al. (2004), Ferrara and Harari (2018)
and Kudamatsu et al. (2014) and many others. In the case of India, the number of
reporting weather stations for the GPCC data set varies from year to year. In 2001 there
were a total of 1197 stations that reported at least some data, while in year 2008 that
number dropped to 978. On average, 15.7 % of the district-year observations have some
rainfall station reporting data. This pattern varies systematically with violence as is
shown in table B6. The table presents results from the same specification as in the main
part of the paper, including region-by NREGA phase time effects and district fixed
effects. The dependent variable is an indicator whether any station reported data for
that district and year. The regressor is either an indicator whether a district experienced
any violent incident in the last year (column (1)) or the number of incidents in column
(2).
The coefficient on the violence indicator is insignificant, with a p-value of 18.5%.
The coefficient on the number of attacks is significant at 5%, indicating that one addi-
8Another example is the case of Vanden Eynde (2016), who had to merge several districts together in
order to obtain consistent rainfall estimates, since many stations simply fail to report rainfall estimates.
Most of these stations are located in places with conflict or in newly created districts or states.
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tional attack per year decreases the probability of a rain gauge station reporting data
in the subsequent year by 1.3%, when evaluating it against the mean of the depen-
dent variable. Despite this general concern, my results are robust to using either the
GPCC data (Schneider et al. (2011)) or the Indian Meterological Department data used
in Vanden Eynde (2016).
As both the GPCC and TRMM data have been processed using climatology al-
gorithms, a general concern is “error propagation” (see Leung et al., 2005; Burnicki
et al., 2007). As the raw data is transformed in the analytical process, the mathematical
and numerical transformations may propagate small simple measurement errors. This
could generate spurious correlations that could affect the results. I remove this sys-
tematic and non-systematic measurement error by instrumenting one dataset for the
other.
Table B6: Weather Station Reporting in
GPCC Varies with Violence
(1) (2)
Any Violence -0.013
(0.009)
Attacks -0.002**
(0.001)
Mean of DV .157 .157
Observations 5440 5440
Number of Districts 544 544
Notes: All regressions are simple linear regres-
sions with time- and district fixed effects. Robust
standard errors clustered at the district level are
given in the parentheses with stars indicating ***
p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
B.9 NREGA data sources and roll out
The data for the roll-out of NREGA come from the Ministry of Rural Development,
which is responsible for administering the scheme. The sequence of roll-out was highly
endogenous to a set of district level characteristics, such as the share of scheduled caste,
scheduled tribe population, baseline agricultural productivity, literacy and existing
levels of conflict. This becomes obvious when considering Figure 1. This picture
highlights that a lot of districts in the east of India received NREGA in the first round.
A lot of these districts did suffer from maoist violence. As discussed in the main body,
I do not require exogeneity of treatment to levels of violence for my empirical design.
There are two main sources for data on NREGA take-up. These are the district-level
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monthly-progress reports (MPR) and data coming from the Management Information
System (MIS). The latter is a completely non-paper based system that has only become
mandatory to use in the financial year but was still not fully operational until 2010-
2011.
There are a lot of issues regarding the reliability of either datasets, as there is quite
some mismatch between the two datasets, especially in the earlier years when the MIS
was introduced.9 This may be due to partial compliance in the MIS after it had been
introduced, but could be also because the MPR system is more subject to manipulation.
It is difficult to asses the underlying divergence in the two databases.
The MPR data is available continually from 2006 to the financial year 2010-2011,
from which point onwards I rely on data from the MIS.10 The format of the reports has
changed considerably, with the major break occurring in 2011. This is partly due to the
evolving nature of NREGA. Ministry of Rural Development (2009) details that several
programs by the Ministry of Water Resources are to be joined with the NREGA by
2011. An important part of this program are rural sanitation projects that are funded
by the Ministry of Water Resources for a set of targeted districts. This implies that
there are district-specific breaks in the NREGA data. In the empirical specifications
which combine data from before and after 2011, I flexibly control for these breaks by
allowing the district fixed effects to be different before and after 2011.
In addition, there are several variable name changes, which may not necessarily re-
flect identical concepts. For example in the MPR data, ”No of Families Completed 100
days” while in the MIS data the variable is labeled ”Total households reached 100 day
limit”. Similarly, the MPR data contains a variable ”Total Employment Demanded”,
which, studying levels, seems to reported by number of households. In the MIS data,
this variable is labeled more clearly as ”Total households demanded work”. Since the
data is collected at monthly frequency, it is not clear whether the numbers refer to the
total number of unique households who demanded employment within a month, or
across months.
I focus on the set of variables that is most cleanly and most consistently reported:
expenditure per capita, number of person days worked per capita as well as the total
number of households demanding employment.
Despite having access to NREGA for many months in a financial year, I only study
the reported metrics at the end of each financial year (that is March of each calendar
9See for example mismatch between MIS data and National Sample Survey returns data highlighted
by http://www.indiatogether.org/2013/jun/gov-nregs.htm,accessed on 12.06.2013.
10Thanks to Clement Imbert for sharing NREGA MPR data for the earliest years.
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year). This becomes necessary as there are significant reporting delays which induce
large jumps in the cumulative month on month measures which are less likely driven
by participation, but more likely due to reporting issues. This measurement error was
most pronounced in the period for which only the paper based MPR based data is
available. The take-up pattern is clear in that the bulk of the NREGA participation is
in the lean season, directly following harvest. See for example for Andhra Pradesh,
Figure 3.
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